In dieser Folge des Geopolitik Podcasts "The Future of Power" spricht Dr. Timo Blenk mit Dr. Peter Ammon, ehemaliger deutscher Diplomat und Staatssekretär im Auswärtigen Amt, über die anstehenden Wahlen in den USA und die außenpolitischen und wirtschaftlichen Entwicklungen des internationalen Schwergewichtes. Dabei geht es unter anderem um aktuelle Entwicklungen im Wahlkampf, die transatlantische Sicherheitsarchitektur, die neue Strategie der USA - „Weaponization of Everything“ - sowie die Konsequenzen der amerikanischen Entwicklungen für europäische Unternehmen und Politik. Unser Podcast ist auch auf Youtube zu finden. Der Link zur Playlist: https://youtu.be/pSf0CCObikY?si=LNP4Q_bojvk0vv8G

In dieser Folge diskutiert Dr. Timo Blenk mit Dr. Parag Khanna über geopolitische Schlüsselfaktoren wie Demografie und Klimawandel und deren Wechselwirkungen.

Mariel von Schumann übernimmt Sitz im Aufsichtsrat der Agora Strategy Group Dr. Christoph Walther scheidet aus dem Aufsichtsrat aus Die erfahrene Unternehmensstrategin und ehemalige Siemens-Managerin Mariel von Schumann ist von der Hauptversammlung mit Wirkung zum 6. Juli 2022 in den Aufsichtsrat der geopolitischen Strategieberatung Agora Strategy gewählt worden. “Mit Mariel von Schumann stärken wir den bestehenden Aufsichtsrat mit Prof. Dr. Kurt Lauk und Dr. Harald Braun durch eine ausgewiesene Expertin, die sich mit ihrer Erfahrung an der Schnittstelle zwischen Geopolitik und Unternehmensentwicklung in der Industrie einen hervorragenden Ruf erworben hat. Bei der zunehmenden Notwendigkeit unserer Kunden, die komplexen geopolitischen Herausforderungen in ihre unternehmerischen Entscheidungen zu integrieren, haben wir mit unserem Beratungsansatz eine Alleinstellung“, sagt Dr. Timo Blenk, CEO der Agora Strategy. Mariel von Schumann ist heute engagiertes Mitglied in verschiedenen Aufsichtsräten. Zuvor übte sie leitende Funktionen in der Siemens AG aus, zuletzt als Stabschefin des ehemaligen CEOs Joe Kaeser. In dieser Rolle war sie für den globalen strategischen Unternehmensumbau sowie für Government Affairs und Investor Relations verantwortlich. „Keine unternehmerische Entscheidung kann heute ohne eine genaue Analyse der politischen Einflussfaktoren getroffen werden. Hier schaffen die Expertise und das globale Netzwerk von über 300 Expertinnen und Experten von Agora Strategy mit ihrem tiefen Verständnis der Zielmärkte einen Mehrwert, der unternehmensintern nicht erbracht werden kann. Die Themen reichen von Versorgungssicherheit, Lieferkettendynamiken und internationalen Machtverschiebungen mit Einfluss auf Sanktionen und Handelsbeziehungen bis hin zu detaillierten Szenarioanalysen. Ich freue mich, meine strategische Perspektive und langjährige Management-Erfahrung als Aufsichtsrätin bei Agora Strategy einzubringen“ so Mariel von Schumann. Mariel von Schumann folgt auf Dr. Christoph Walther, der diese Funktion seit Gründung der Agora Strategy Group innehatte. Der Aufsichtsratsvorsitzende Dr. Kurt Lauk dankte ihm für die langjährige Unterstützung: „Dr. Walther hat die Entwicklung der Agora Strategy Group zu einer der führenden europäischen geopolitischen Strategieberatungen entscheidend unterstützt. Für seinen umfassenden Einsatz möchte ich mich im Namen des gesamten Aufsichtsrates ausdrücklich bedanken.“ Über Agora Strategy Die Agora Strategy Group ist mit ihrem weltweiten Netzwerk von Expertinnen und Experten eine auf geopolitische Risikoanalysen, Business Diplomacy und globale politische Positionierungsstrategien spezialisierte Beratung. Der hausinterne Think-Tank, das Agora Strategy Institute unter Leitung des früheren UN-Botschafters Dr. Harald Braun, unterstützt mit maßgeschneiderten Analysen den umfassenden Beratungsansatz und stimuliert den wissenschaftlichen Diskurs.

In dieser Folge des Geopolitik Podcasts "The Future of Power" spricht Dr. Timo Blenk mit Dirk Hoke, CEO von Volocopter und langjähriger Manager bei Siemens und Airbus Defence & Space, über Innovationen, Zukunftstechnologien und geopolitische Umbrüche. Dabei geht es unter anderem um die deutsch-französische Zusammenarbeit bei Industrieprojekten, das transatlantische Bündnis, wichtige Chancen durch Technologiefortschritte sowie den Industriestandort Deutschland.

In dieser Episode spricht Dr. Timo Gerrit Blenk mit der renommierten deutsch-französischen Politikwissenschaftlerin und Analystin Dr. Florence Gaub über den Wandel und die Zukunft der europäischen Sicherheitsarchitektur, die Beziehungen Frankreich-Deutschlands in der europäischen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik und den eskalierenden Konflikt im Nahen Osten.

In dieser Folge spricht Dr. Timo Blenk mit Dr. Cornelius Adebahr, unabhängiger Politikberater und Analyst sowie Senior Fellow und Editor in Chief unseres hausinternen Think-Tanks Agora Strategy Institute, über den Iran. Dabei geht es unter anderem um das Verhältnis zwischen Russland und dem Iran, die strategischen Bestrebungen des Landes sowie die Stimmung innerhalb der iranischen Bevölkerung. Außerdem skizzieren wir die geopolitisch-relevanten Themen des nächsten Jahres.

In dieser Folge spricht Dr. Timo Blenk mit Prof. Jörg Rocholl, Präsident der European School of Management and Technology, über Geoökonomie und die wirtschaftliche Dimension von Geopolitik. Dabei geht es beispielsweise um die Frage, ob die Weltwirtschaft „politischer“ wird und es einen fundamentalen Wandel mit Abkehr vom Grundprinzip des Freihandels gibt?

Executive Summary Western powers unveiled the new India-Middle East-Europe Corridor (IMEC) at the recent G20 summit as a major cross-border initiative for trade infrastructure, but also electricity, data, and hydrogen connectivity. Backed by the United States and European powers, the initiative challenges China’s dominance both in South Asia and the Middle East, not least by seeking to position Saudi Arabia and the UAE more squarely in the western camp . Energy will likely be the primary pillar of the initiative, but increased connecti­vity can yield significant other benefits on food security, supply chains and tourism. Saudi Arabia’s ambitions in particular go far beyond energy trade. Implications for International Business European businesses will benefit from increased connectivity to the Arab Peninsula and the business prospects of a vibrant region, as they can participate in infrastructure development and enjoy improved energy security. However, Indian manufacturers with their favorable access to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) market will provide strong competition for European firms . Despite the project’s geopolitical intentions, Chinese manufacturers are unlikely to be shut out of the Middle East anytime soon, not least as Saudi Arabia and the UAE continue to rely on them for advanced weaponry and nuclear energy. State of Play More than countering China’s ambitions At the G20 summit in New Delhi in September 2023, world leaders announced an am­bitious project to better link the Indian subcontinent to Europe via the Arab Peninsula. The India-Middle East-Europe Corridor (IMEC) aims to enhance connectivity and economic integration through a cross-border ship-to-rail transit network stretching from India via Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Jordan, and Israel up to Greece and Italy. While enhancing existing maritime and road transportation routes, the initiative will also build rail connections as well as new electricity, data, and hydrogen infrastructure. The multimodal transport and energy project is backed by both the United States and the EU, including France and Germany. After the global infrastructure investment scheme “Build Back Better World” launched by the G7 in June 2022, this is the second US-led vehicle to counter China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The latter, now in its tenth year, has begun to suffer from fewer funds on the Chinese side and meager results on the recipients’ side. Still, the rationale for connecting world regions via the IMEC goes beyond a simple anti-China plot. Termed a “green and digital bridge across continents and civilizations” by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen during the signing ceremony, the project is set to advance the United Nation’s sustainable development goals, in particular the green transition and digital connectivity. At the same time, it aims to boost economic cooperation between India and Europe as much as between the Gulf states and Israel. The Middle East in particular is conceived as a hub for economic activity, between Asia and Europe but also among its often-antagonistic neighbors. No announcement on financing has been made yet. Instead, a working group of participating countries will develop more detailed plans, including on timelines and funding, over the next two months. As of yet, it is still only a Memorandum of Understanding between a diverse group of states. Key Issues An economic initiative centering on the Middle East… On the surface, IMEC can be seen as a response to the geopolitical and geo-economic challenge that China poses to the West. Some Middle Eastern countries, including Saudi Arabia and the UAE that are typically considered to be in the Western camp, have increasingly become economically reliant on China. By strengthening India’s relations with the Gulf and by tying the latter region to Europe in areas beyond hydrocarbons, IMEC could, in the medium term, undercut Beijing’s ability to project its influence there and reduce Europe’s exposure and reliance on China as well. The initiative also appears to serve other objectives. For one, it seeks to economically integrate Israel with its Arab neighbors from Jordan down to the Arabian Peninsula, which would in itself be a game-changer. Following up on the 2020 Abraham Accords, it should help to create an economic and infrastructure environment to advance the possibility of regional peace. More substantially, IMEC reflects the deepening integration and rising power of the initiative’s main players, India, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. It recognizes, and possibly formalizes, India’s ambitions to become a global power that can act as a counter­weight to China, especially in Asia and the Middle East. IMEC also strongly positions Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Part of the BRI, both have rejected the idea of the multipolar world and do not subscribe to the idea of having to choose between the United States and China. Each will try to maximize their benefits from both sides, including by approaching China to provide goods and services where the West may not be forthcoming, such as advanced weapon systems and nuclear reactors. Their recent admission into the China-led BRICS group is a case in point. At the same time, Washington recently expanded restrictions of the export of semiconductors to a number of Middle Eastern countries. In the long-term, Saudi Arabia will especially benefit from its role as a major logistics hub, which it believes has been a major limitation in attracting manufacturers. IMEC will also benefit Jordan and Israel as transit countries. From a political perspective, increased trade integration could serve to stabilize the region and increase interdependence, both beneficial to Israel. However, such an outcome largely rests on a just and acceptable resolution to the Palestinian question. Jordan, in contrast, will find the project difficult to implement, given popular sentiment against any cooperation with Israel. Other countries have been quite unpleased with the proposal. Turkey, the gateway between Asian and European markets in its own conception, immediately renounced the initiative. Pakistan, whose strategic importance to the GCC has been in decline for several years, most likely shares the sentiment but has been less vocal. Both also figure centrally in the BRI and very much depend on its economic success. Qatar has also been completely side-stepped in the initiative, and its isolation will be further exacerbated if natural gas becomes included in IMEC. Each of these countries, and others like China, will be tempted to undermine the initiative in their own ways. One major unknown is how IMEC will impact Egypt and the Suez Canal and whether IMEC will offer the country any benefits in return for a possible diversion of trade to other routes. …that could shake up trade routes and markets The initiative’s ambitions are comprehensive and forward-looking, with the possibility to change trade patterns at global level. Energy will be its main pillar, at least in the short-term, from the export of clean energy to the laying of undersea cables and by linking energy grids to expand reliable access to electricity. Europe as well as India are major customers of the region’s oil and gas, but adding hydrogen to the equation is set to open new markets. Europe, in particular, will benefit from increased connectivity and energy security through IMEC. In addition, participating nations envision to expand existing trade and manufacturing to spur the creation of quality jobs while strengthening food security and supply chains, Establishing telecommunication lines to connect communities across the corridor to a secure and stable Internet will boost both business and people-to-people ties. Once implemented, IMEC is likely to increase connectivity, trade, and tourism at large. Ultimately, the initiative’s prospects clearly rest on how much – fresh – funding it can mobilize, including from the private sector, and how quickly it can progress. If IMEC takes off at the moment that BRI loses steam, it could further bifurcate international trade and investment into competing blocs, reflecting the multipolar world emerging after decades of US-led globalization. Such a future could see a Chinese sphere of influence in Central Asia and Africa, where it is already quite well established, and an American-led one in South Asia and Europe. Regions like the Middle East and Southeast Asia will likely be contested regions that will try to please both sides.

Executive Summary Cybercrime and cyber insecurity are now among the Top 10 of most severe global risks over the next decade, listed alongside threats including climate change and involuntary migration. As geopolitics and cyber increasingly intertwine, cyber-attacks become more frequent and sophisticated, as both state and non-state actors, in particular from China and Russia, try to disrupt democratic societies, economies, and militaries. In part driven by the military conflict in Ukraine, the EU, the US, and NATO have begun to enhance their own cyber capabilities and to issue new cyber­security regulations that directly impact globally active firms. Implications for International Business Industries need to prioritize cybersecurity as an integral part of their strategies: They should adopt a risk-based approach, implementing security and privacy measures that align with an ever more volatile threat landscape. Cybercrime alone will cost companies worldwide an estimated $10.5 trillion by 2025 , up from $3 trillion in 2015 per annum. At a growth rate of 15 percent year after year, it represents one of the greatest transfers of economic wealth in history. In addition to cyber-attacks driven by the war in Ukraine, business trends like tele-working and digital interconnectedness heighten the probability of successful strikes , putting sensitive data, intellectual property, and financial assets at risk State of Play Global competition moves into cyberspace Cyberspace is becoming a new battlefield and an area of geostrategic competition. The increasing sophistication and frequency of cyber-attacks pose significant risks and threats to governments, companies, and individuals. They include ransomware, malware and zero-day vulnerabilities, social engineering like new forms of phishing, threats against data and large Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, destruction of infrastructure and corporate networks, dis- and misinformation, and supply-chain targeting. During peacetime, both states, their proxies, and non-state actors deploy cyber operations to disrupt the smooth functioning of democracies, collect intelligence, undermine legitimate governments, and steal trade secrets or cripple businesses. Cyber-attacks in the EU conducted by state proxies and criminal groups operating from Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran seriously damage Europe’s economic competitiveness and socio-political fabric. In June 2023 alone, Russia-linked attacks targeted European banks, including the European Investment Bank, U.S. federal government agencies, including Department of Energy entities, and Swiss government websites, including the Parliament, the federal administration, and Geneva airport. During wartime, malicious actors use cyber tools to erode their adversaries’ military advantage. In the first half of 2022, Ukraine experienced 1,350 cyber-attacks on its critical infrastructure alongside kinetic attacks conducted by Russia, to which it has proved remarkably resilient. Crucially, it is backed by offensive and defensive cyber interventions from the U.S. Cyber Command, assistance from the tech giants like Microsoft and Google, and networks of international and homegrown information security researchers. Against this backdrop and given the increasing competition of international players, the EU unveiled its Cyber Defence Policy in November 2022. It represents the EU’s first comprehensive effort to outline strategic, policy, operational, and capability development goals in cyber defense. In the case of cyber defense, widespread accessibility to AI-powered tools combined with the refined tactics of state and non-state actors mean that the international threat landscape is becoming ever more dangerous. Key Issues Emerging cyber alliances foster a geopolitical divide Faced with a “geo-politicisation” of the cyber landscape, the EU and NATO adopt a multi-faceted approach. This includes developing robust cybersecurity strategies, increasing interoperability, investing in cutting-edge cyber defense capabilities, conducting cyber deterrence operations, and collaborating with international partners. International alliance-building is paramount in the fight against cyber threats. For instance, in February 2016 the computer emergency/incident response teams of the EU and NATO signed a bilateral Technical Agreement on the exchange of information about threat actors and techniques. Cyber-related intelligence sharing and capacity building with partner countries have also markedly improved. Yet, the sustainability of these efforts depends on shared interests, trust among participants, and effective coordination mechanisms. Elections, like the upcoming U.S. elections in 2024, changes in political leadership in international organizations, or shifts in political priorities and ideological differences can affect the willingness to share sensitive cyber intelligence and collaborate on capacity-building initiatives. The rise of China further complicates the cyber threat landscape, as its growing influence challenges the dominance of cyber powers like the United States. Beijing has begun to move from cyber espionage for economic interests to explicitly aiming at global technological superiority and a (re)shaping of the Internet. To remain competitive, the EU and NATO, member states and like-minded countries need to invest in enhancing their own cyber capabilities and foster international collaboration around responsible state behavior in cyberspace. An open, safe, and secure global cyberspace is one in which businesses can expand their operations globally without cybersecurity risks, as it increases consumer confidence, data protection, and privacy, while public-private partnerships enable businesses to benefit from threat intelligence and cybersecurity best practices. Yet, the absence of accountability mechanisms to curb the impunity of states violating international law and the limited options to enforce the agreed norms of responsible state behavior in cyberspace make it necessary for the EU and NATO to search for alternative policy solutions. The new EU framework establishes cybersecurity standards, requirements, and reporting obligations that apply to certain sectors such as critical infrastructure and digital service providers, to safeguard their systems and services. Businesses can obtain cybersecurity certificates for their products and services, enhancing their credibility, consumer trust, and market competitiveness. In short, the benefits of the peaceful use of cyberspace can no longer be taken for granted. Firms face acute threats and diverse rules Alliance-building in cyberspace across democratic and autocratic fault lines has significant influence on industries around the globe. It enhances cybersecurity efforts by promoting information-sharing between democracies, collaborative defense measures, and coordinated responses between the private-private and civil-military sectors. Yet, there are also risks, such as potential information-sharing dilemmas where sensitive data being exposed to unintended recipients and cyber defence dependencies leaving industries vulnerable to an attack on another alliance member. In turn, any cooperation with autocratic countries like China in the realm of cybersecurity involves various high-risk factors, given its rapprochement with Russia, its cyber espionage and state-sponsored cyber-attacks, surveillance practices as well as ethical and human rights abuses. Conversely, the use of economic sanctions and trade restrictions can potentially impact cyber relations between states and non-state actors. Such measures can limit the availability of certain technologies, restrict information sharing, and hinder cooperation. This can hamper efforts to build resilient cyber ecosystems. In this regard, businesses should actively engage in the development of international and national cybersecurity standards, policies, and norms. By providing input and expertise, they can ensure that initiatives are practical, realistic, and considerate of private sector realities. At the company level, investing in advanced technologies, implementing robust incident response plans, conducting regular risk assessments, and enhancing employee awareness and training are elements of any sound stratgey. In order to adapt to evolving regulatory and legal frameworks across different jurisdictions, firms need to implement robust data protection practices, conduct privacy impact assessments, employ privacy-enhancing technologies, adopt privacy-by-design principles, and establish effective mechanisms for data governance and consent management. Despite the challenges engendered by cyber threats, companies can leverage the opportunities of the digital transformation by adopting a proactive security posture that integrates cybersecurity into every aspect of their operations. This will ensure that businesses can benefit from advanced digital tools and automation processes, access to global markets, data-driven insights and products, as well as innovation, agility, and scalability by adopting AI-powered tools and cloud computing.

Executive Summary As a pivotal node in the global semiconductor supply chain, the Republic of China, Taiwan has become an indispensable part of the global economy , thus making a conflict around the island felt across the world. The geopolitical rivalry between the People’s Republic of China and the United States has zeroed in on Taiwan , which Beijing claims as its own, even though it has never ruled it, and which Washington has broadly declared to defend. Several democracies have begun reinforcing their economic security measures towards China , on particular key industries, their supply chains, and critical raw materials (CRM), while expanding trade links with Taiwan. Implications for International Business A military conflict or blockade in the Taiwan Strait would seriously disrupt shipbound trade between Asia and Europe ; European car and auto part manufacturers in particular should have contingency plans in place. As Taiwanese chips firms diversify production away from China, EU businesses stand to benefit from cooperation on relocating production and services to Japan, Singapore, and Vietnam as well as increased direct investments in Europe. Given Taiwan’s ongoing energy security challenges, European firms’ technology such as offshore wind power offers substantial opportunities for expansion . State of Play Ten weeks into Russia’s war against Ukraine, The Economist called Taiwan the “most dangerous place on Earth” last May. That was a reference to the island’s increased geostrategic relevance, both as a major economic player and the object of China’s ambition for ‘unification’, if necessary, by force. Beijing’s pressure tactics, combined with military maneuvers in the Taiwan Strait, endanger stability in the Indo-Pacific where roughly half of the world’s container ships transit. Beyond that, fears abound that a conflict, military or otherwise, between China and Taiwan would lead to a wider US-China confrontation with global consequences. So far, however, efforts to isolate Taiwan have backfired: the international community, including the EU, is expanding cooperation, not reducing it. Accounting for over a quarter of Taiwan’s foreign direct investments (FDI), the EU saw both its exports to and imports from Taiwan rise in 2021, by 24.1 and 34.6 percent, respectively. Total trade valued €35.6bn, 94.9% of which is in manufactured goods such as electronic components, telecommunications equipment, machinery, transport equipment, and chemicals including pharmaceuticals. Also, political support to Taiwan participating in Inter­national Organizations where statehood is not required has increased, as have con­demnations of Chinese coercion by the G7 and NATO as well as parliamentary delegations visiting Taiwan in a show of solidarity. While no major Western state is expected to recognize Taiwan as a sovereign country anytime soon out of fear of provoking an escalation with China, their aim is to reinforce deterrence against the People’s Republic by strengthening engagement with the island nation. Key Issues The geopolitical stakes are high around the Strait As a country of critical importance to the world economy facing territorial claims by a nuclear-armed global power, Taiwan represents the essence of a challenge that is both geopolitical and geo-economic in nature. The potential military confrontation with China that has increasingly kept strategists busy would have immediate consequences around the globe, from severe trade disruptions to a superpower confrontation not seen for decades. Crucially, Taiwan relies on imports for 98 percent of its energy needs. With most of its LNG imports passing through the South China Sea, Taiwan’s energy supply chain is fragile, its power grid lacks resilience, and its electricity consumption is rising, not least due to firms investing in new capacity at home. Given limited reserves, it is estimated that Taiwan could withstand a Chinese blockade only for a short while, ranging from a mere fortnight regarding natural gas to nearly six weeks for coal or over four months for oil. More broadly, it is estimated that war in the Taiwan Strait would cause $2tn damage to the global economy resulting from severed global supply chains, involving anything from financial services to life sciences. A naval blockade alone would shut down trade through the Taiwan Strait, increasing shipping cost overall for certain raw materials. Moreover, Taiwan’s financial system is highly vulnerable to Chinese cyber and other asymmetric attacks. These would also damage economies exposed to semiconductor-related value chains, including global producers of cars and auto components such as China, the United States, Japan and Germany as well as economies where automotive production represents an important share of domestic production, namely Slovakia, Czechia, and Hungary. In this global setting, Taiwan’s upcoming presidential election is expected to be highly competitive with an uncertain, but possibly decisive outcome. For one, the traditional duopoly of the independence-minded Democratic Progressive Party of incumbent President Tsai Ing-wen and the more mainland-friendly Kuomintang risks being upset by the newly founded Taiwan People’s Party. The latter offers a middle way on China relations by focusing on popular domestic issues such as energy and housing, but with conciliatory tones towards the PRC. For another, Beijing seeks to influence the political debate on the island in its favor through grey-zone activities like dis­information, cyberattacks, military incursions into its airspace, simulations of a naval blockade, and selective economic coercion. In this global setting, Taiwan’s upcoming presidential election is expected to be highly competitive with an uncertain, but possibly decisive outcome. For one, the traditional duopoly of the independence-minded Democratic Progressive Party of incumbent President Tsai Ing-wen and the more mainland-friendly Kuomintang risks being upset by the newly founded Taiwan People’s Party. The latter offers a middle way on China relations by focusing on popular domestic issues such as energy and housing, but with conciliatory tones towards the PRC. For another, Beijing seeks to influence the political debate on the island in its favor through grey-zone activities like dis­information, cyberattacks, military incursions into its airspace, simulations of a naval blockade, and selective economic coercion. Therefore, even if escalation can be avoided through 2023, the cards will be shuffled anew at the beginning of next year. Trading chips, threats, and other goods – or bads Tensions around Taiwan have already reshaped regional relations. Taiwanese firms have begun to re-shore and nearshore away from China, mostly to East and Southeast Asia as well as back home in Taiwan itself. For example, TSMC invested $2.12bn in 2022 to establish a subsidiary in Japan, and Taiwan’s MediaTek Inc. provided a $1bn capital injection in Singapore, while investments in China decreased. Southeast Asian states, in turn, are re-assessing their dependencies with the PRC. Some, such as Vietnam, have increasingly integrated into diversified supply chains, offering alternate location for manufacturing. In fact, stronger regional links could help Taiwan garner support to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, a free trade pact including most Pacific nations except China and the United States. Meanwhile, the US and the EU have converged on the need to “de-risk” their China relations to protect key technologies, as opposed to the initial – and farther reaching – idea of a broader de-coupling. The EU now sees Taiwan as a like-minded partner in the Indo-Pacific, with substantial cooperation on information and communication technologies (ICT). Affected by pandemic-induced supply chain disruptions and overreliance on China in critical sectors, the EU has agreed to increase state support to help domestic semiconductor production capacity, and TSMC is considering opening a plant in Germany. Taiwan’s chips are vital to its green and digital transition, so the EU also started to link experts from the two sides in cluster-to-cluster, ecosystem-to-ecosystem cooperation on R&D and supply chain monitoring, connecting the European Commission, Taiwan governmental agencies, companies, and clusters. The closer EU-Taiwan relations get, the harder will be the impact of a conflict in the Strait.