In dieser Folge spricht Roberta Randerath von Agora Strategy mit der Expertin für Weltraumsicherheitspolitik Andrea Rotter von der Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung über die strategische Bedeutung des Weltraums im Kontext geopolitischer Rivalität.

Was haben Geopolitik und Finanzstrategien gemeinsam? Mehr, als man denkt, sagt unser neuer Senior Partner Prof. Dr. Kai Andrejewski im Gespräch mit Dr. Timo Blenk. Was hat dich dazu bewogen, die Branche (von SIXT SE zu Agora Strategy) zu wechseln? In meiner Rolle als CFO der SIXT SE war eine meiner wesentlichen Verantwortlichkeiten die Entwicklung der Equity- und Debtstory der Gesellschaft – also der Kapitalmarktstory. Dabei ergaben sich immer wieder Schnittstellen, die mir klarmachten, dass eine fundierte geopolitische Analyse die Grundvoraussetzung hierfür ist. Daher war der Wechsel zu Agora Strategy eine inhaltliche Weiterentwicklung. Des Weiteren bin ich persönlich davon überzeugt, dass es sehr viel Freude macht, beruflich neue Perspektiven zu entwickeln. SIXT ist ein sehr innovatives Unternehmen, es hat sich also gar nicht so viel geändert. Welche geopolitischen Faktoren beeinflussen deiner Erfahrung nach die Finanzstrategien internationaler Unternehmen? Die Kapitalmarktstrategie eines Unternehmens muss die geopolitischen Rahmenbedingungen berücksichtigen. Dies fängt bei unterschiedlicher Regulatorik in den USA und in Europa an. Viel entscheidender ist aber, dass jede finanzpolitische Entscheidung geopolitische Implikationen hat. Kann ein Börsengang in den USA beispielsweise mit einer chinesisch geprägten Lieferkette einhergehen? Welche Rolle spielt Geopolitik in Investitionsentscheidungen heutzutage? Hier gibt es zum einen umfangreiche regulatorische Interdependenzen. Aber für europäische Unternehmen ist der Fokus breiter. Gewinnmaximierung muss mit den restriktiven europäischen Regeln in Einklang gebracht werden. Darüber hinaus sind aber auch geopolitische Risiken und Chancen mit einzubeziehen. So kann beispielsweise ein differenziertes Tax- und Zollregime in den USA auch Arbitragemöglichkeiten bieten. Wie entwickelt man resiliente Finanzstrategien in unsicheren Zeiten? Das „kleine Einmaleins“ hinsichtlich Liquidität und Performance bleibt grundsätzlich unberührt. Allerdings müssen global agierende europäische Unternehmen berücksichtigen, dass der Kapitalmarkt nicht vorbehaltlos global ist. Daher sollten sie sowohl auf der Debt- als auch auf der Equity-Seite auf Internationalisierung setzen. Das fängt bei einer differenzierten Bankenlandschaft an und geht bis zu Standort- und Taxoptimierung. Welcher geopolitische Trend hat aktuell den größten Einfluss auf globale Märkte? Die Veränderung von einer globalen regelbasierten Ordnung zu einem multipolaren Umfeld macht gerade vor den globalen Märkten, aber besonders vor den Finanzmärkten nicht halt. Interessant werden hier die Rückkoppelungen sein, die noch nicht so sehr im Fokus stehen. Inwieweit können amerikanische Investoren weiterhin in europäische Unternehmen investieren, die Nachhaltigkeitsziele vor Profitabilitätsziele stellen? Und wie werden sich europäische Unternehmen im Vergleich zu amerikanischen Unternehmen behaupten können, wenn die Deregulierung in den USA deutlich schneller voranschreitet?

In dem Agora Strategy Geopolitik-Podcast „The Future of Power“ lädt Dr. Timo Blenk (CEO), monatlich Entscheidungsträger aus Diplomatie; Wirtschaft; Politik und Militär ein, um aktuelle geopolitische Entwicklungen zu diskutieren. Über die Einflüsse dieser zu informieren und fundierte Entscheidungsgrundlagen zu schaffen, ist der Kern dieses Projekts. Diesen Monat war Herr Stefan Kornelius, Leiter des Politk-Ressort der Süddeutsche Zeitung, zu Gast! In der 24ten Folge unseres Podcasts sprechen Dr. Blenk und Herr Kornelius über die Hintergründe der aktuellen Schlagzeilen! Die wichtigsten Themen des Monats USA – Großmacht ohne Richtung?: Selbstverleugnung, transaktionale Politik und die Erschöpfung des Liberalismus. Die Zukunft der EU: Zwischen Bürokratie-Kritik, der Herausforderung im Osten und darüber hinaus und einem bröckelnden Versprechen. Medien im Umbruch: News-Fatigue, Atomisierung und die Rolle von KI – wie sich der Journalismus verändert. Deutschland 2025: Zwischen Personal- & Koalitionsfragen.   Hausmitteilungen   Alle weiteren Folgen des Podcasts Agora Strategy Webauftritt Agora Strategy bei LinkedIn Aktuelle Projekte & Veranstaltungen des Agora-Strategy-Teams Agora Strategy Institute Executive Mitgliedschaft Dean's Comment: Dr. Peter Ammon zu Trumps Comeback Neue Publikation von Dr. Elli Pohlkamp - Südkorea & Japan For English subtitles please find our podcast on youtube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HNYbun-ORPY

In dem Agora Strategy Group Geopolitik-Podcast „The Future of Power“ lädt Dr. Timo Blenk (CEO), monatlich Entscheidungsträger aus Diplomatie; Wirtschaft; Politik und Militär ein, um aktuelle geopolitische Entwicklungen zu diskutieren. Über die Einflüsse dieser zu informieren und fundierte Entscheidungsgrundlagen zu schaffen, ist der Kern dieses Projekts.   In dieser 23. Folge greifen Dr. Timo Blenk und Prof. Dr. Kai Andrejewski, beide Senior Partner bei der Agora Strategy Group, Ihre Fragen auf, analysieren aktuelle Entwicklungen und diskutieren praxisnahe Maßnahmen, die Unternehmen jetzt ergreifen sollten. Moderiert wurde die Folge von Christina Schäfer, Consultant bei der Agora Strategy Group.   Die wichtigsten Themen des Monats (siehe Beschreibung) Von A wie Autoindustrie bis Z wie Zusammenhalt in Europa: Rundumschlag Geopolitik & Unternehmen Das transatlantische Verhältnis im Wandel: Trump 2.0 - Herausforderungen & Chancen Europäische Prioritäten: Verteidigung & gemeinsame Prioritären  Im Blick behalten: Indien, Satellitentechnik, Wasser, Demografie & Finanzkrisen   Hausmitteilungen   Alle weiteren Folgen des Podcasts „Agora Strategy Group“ Webauftritt „Agora Strategy Group“ bei LinkedIn Aktuelle Projekte & Veranstaltungen des Agora-Strategy-Teams Agora Strategy Institute Executive Mitgliedschaft Dean's Comment: Dr. Peter Ammon zu Trumps Comeback Neue Publikation von Dr. Elli Pohlkamp - Südkorea & Japan

Dr. Cornelius Adebahr ist Senior Fellow und Editor des Agora Strategy Institutes. Er arbeitet darüber hinaus als unabhängiger politischer Analyst und Berater in Berlin und Rom. Seine Expertise umfasst außen- und sicherheitspolitische Fragen, insbesondere zu Iran und dem Persischen Golf, sowie die europäische und transatlantische Zusammenarbeit.Zu seinen Kunden zählen politische Institutionen, Unternehmen und zivilgesellschaftliche Organisationen sowie internationale Think Tanks.   Adebahr ist Lehrbeauftragter an der Hertie School in Berlin. Zuvor lehrte er an der Georgetown University in Washington, DC, der Willy Brandt School of Public Policy in Erfurt und der Universität Teheran in Iran. Er veröffentlicht häufig in, und wird zitiert von, internationalen Medien wie der New York Times, der Washington Post, POLITICO, BBC, CNN, Euronews und Al Jazeera. Expertise Geopolitische Herausforderungen, Strategische Vorausschau, Europäische Union und USA, Iran und Nahost Auswahl an Publikationen und Podcasts Agora Strategy Podcast The Future of Power - Schattenspiele im Nahen Osten – Der Iran und seine geopolitische Agenda If this is Israel’s 9/11, it must not make same mistakes the US did Why AI will Change the Core of Foreign Policymaking Wofür lohnt es sich zu kämpfen? Why water scarcity in Iran is a source of domestic and regional instability. Trump’s ‘virtual reality’ foreign policy Towards a New Balkans Diplomacy The Rewriting of Global Rules, as Seen from India

Executive Summary In the context of growing turbulence around the world, Latin America stands out as a region of low geopolitical risk, where most governments, including Brazil and Mexico, pursue a “multi-aligned strategy” that does not take sides. This helps to attract investors keen to diversify their portfolios and increase their resilience. Brazil positions itself as a key player in the global energy transition, both as a source of critical minerals and a destination of “greenshoring” investments. However, it is also massively ramping up oil production as is set to become the world’s sixth largest producer by 2030. Mexico gained from its long-standing open trade policy and solid manufacturing base, with the potential to hugely benefit from US nearshoring. It also made progress on reducing inequality, but faces major uncertainties from the US election, the risk of democratic backsliding, and continued domestic insecurity. Implications for International Business European firms have the opportunity to capitalize on both Brazil’s and Mexico’s push to diversify both their economies to retain strategic flexibility amidst the risk of a renewed trade war between the United States and China. Brazil and Mexico are promising business hubs, especially in trade, manufacturing, and renewable energy, though a fragile security situation is unlikely to be resolved. The ratification of the EU-Mercosur trade deal, increasingly likely by the end of 2024, would create the world’s largest free trade area of 780 million people and facilitate European investments in Brazil. State of Play Great power competition and global supply chains shape business opportunities in Latin America Latin American countries have more relevant economic ties outside the region than within, each engaging with China and the United States on their own terms. As Washington becomes less open and lacks a clear strategy vis-à-vis its southern neighbors, Beijing is advancing, creating new economic dependencies but without crowding out others. European trade and investment is largely seen as less politically fraught, while more unequal trade with China tends to elicit greater fears about deindustrialization.   Nearshoring and shifts in global supply chains are set to produce expansion and a competitive environment in Latin America across sectors such as manufacturing, electronics, automotive, renewable energy, and resource extraction, especially of critical raw materials. The US Inflation Reduction Act is a source of competition for investments in green energy and electric vehicles, particularly in Mexico and in mineral-rich countries. There is nonetheless an open path for European companies for greater engagement in the region, given stable and trusted EU-Latin America relationships, the region’s needs of diversification, and the new opportunity provided by the hoped-for conclusion of the EU-Mercosur free trade agreement this year. Key Issues Brazil: Multipolarity does not mean diversification Brazil maintains balanced foreign and trade relations while it seeks to benefit from a more diverse world economy, aiming to become an influential voice in the Global South. While its BRICS membership serves to advance a multipolar order which includes initiatives to seek alternatives to the dollar when trading with countries like China, it also cooperates with OECD countries on numerous fronts and has recently decided not to join China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Within the BRICS grouping, Brazil is, alongside India, the moderating force that opposes the more explicitly anti-Western faction led by Russia, China and Iran.    The Brazilian economy benefits from shifting global supply chains, particularly in the manufacturing and logistics sectors. The government under President Lula actively seeks foreign investment in infrastructure, among others through the New Growth Acceleration Program. It has also pushed through a historic tax reform, though concerns about fiscal sustainability remain. As Brazil strives to lead on environmental sustainability, Europe is an important partner for technology investments and export diversification.   Amid global concerns about food security, Brazil’s agricultural sector is expected to grow, providing opportunities for sustainable agriculture and agri-tech innovations. Already well-positioned in the Chinese market, there will be more diversification efforts to reduce overreliance on China’s demand for agricultural commodities. Total investments from the United States and EU countries, respectively, are larger than Chinese investments in Brazil, but increasing trade dependence on China explain a willingness to diversify and reduce strategic vulnerabilities. ESG initiatives can find opportunities in Brazil given its renewable energy sector and its global relevance in environmental sustainability. In tech, the country provides an increasing start-up network to be harnessed by foreign firms. Organized crime remains a continuous challenge and threatens to permeate political institutions, though murder rates have recently fallen. Mexico: Externally driven growth, democratic backsliding and uncertainty over US policy Amid high domestic insecurity, President Claudia Sheinbaum won a landslide victory promising to continue the previous government’s populist leftist policies. However, many of these – including unfunded social spending, weak human rights protection and the introduction of popular elections for justices – have been roundly criticized by the opposition and investors. Hailed by Scheinbaum as the possibility to build “the true rule of law”, the reforms may pose a risk to the independence of the judiciary and produce legal uncertainty for investors. A politicized judiciary that is vulnerable to criminal groups will make businesses more reliant on personal relations with the government and imply lower prospects of a fair trial, if required. The result of the first cycle of election for the Judiciary in mid-2025 may affect domestic and foreign investments, as will any other measures reflecting or deepening the executive’s uncontested power.   Still, the new government can be expected to be pragmatic, with a strong focus on bolstering Mexico’s role within the North American business sphere. This approach will be put to the test if Donald Trump returns to the White House. The softest baseline scenario includes strict national security measures permeating US economic policy, but more likely is a harsh protectionist approach including steep tariffs. At the same time, the USMCA trade agreement acts as an important constraint on Mexico building out its trade and relationships with China. This could be an incentive for the next US president to renew, possibly with some changes, the trilateral trade deal when it is up for review in 2026. While outgoing president Lopez Obrador doubled down on fossil fuels, Sheinbaum, a climate scientist, can be expected to boost investment in renewable energies and emphasize decarbonization.   As Mexico’s second-largest trading partner with an annual bilateral volume of around US$100 billion, China has an important presence as a supplier in electronics, automotive, and consumer goods. Nevertheless, Mexico offers a diversification destination for European companies, while the latter can help the country reduce its reliance on Chinese imports or investments. Shifting supply chains away from China has the potential to drive Mexico’s growth as a nearshoring hub for trade, manufacturing, and technology, with e-commerce and innovations in cross-border logistics on the rise. Prominent sectors for European firms are the automotive, electronics and aerospace, which benefit from these trends as well as cost-effective operations to serve not just the Mexican but also the US market.

In dem Agora Strategy Group Geopolitik-Podcast „The Future of Power“ lädt Dr. Timo Blenk (CEO), monatlich Entscheidungsträger aus Diplomatie; Wirtschaft; Politik und Militär ein, um aktuelle geopolitische Entwicklungen zu diskutieren. Über die Einflüsse dieser zu informieren und fundierte Entscheidungsgrundlagen zu schaffen, ist der Kern dieses Projekts.   Im November sind Sie gefragt: Schicken Sie uns Ihre Fragen rund um das Thema Geopolitik & Unternehmen, welche wir dann im Podcast beantworten werden!   Die wichtigsten Themen des Monats Neue geopolitische Ära: Rückblick auf die vergangenen zwei Jahre & Zukunftsausblick Hotspot USA: Präsidentschafts- & Kongresswahlen Die Themen von Morgen: Afrikanische Konflikte, nukleare Drohkulisse & Pakistan Das europäische Projekt: zwischen Chancen & fehlender Führung   Hausmitteilungen   Alle weiteren Folgen des Podcasts „Agora Strategy Group“ Webauftritt „Agora Strategy Group“ bei LinkedIn   Aktuelle Projekte & Veranstaltungen des Agora-Strategy-Teams Agora Institute exklusive Mitgliedschaft Neue Publikation von Dr. Elli Pohlkamp - Südkorea & Japan

Executive Summary Vietnam has recently witnessed changes in political leadership at unprecedented speed. While the grip on power of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) looks uncontested, fissures have become visible ahead of the 2026 party congress. Vietnam continues to be one of the fastest growing economies with an annual growth rate of five percent in 2023. The country benefits from the intensifying Sino-American rivalry as companies diversify from China to Vietnam. In quick succession, the leaders of the United States, China, and Russia visited Hanoi vying for closer ties due to the country’s strategic location in Southeast Asia. Implications for International Business Vietnam emerges as a manufacturing alternative to China in certain sectors such as garment/fashion or electronic devices. However, it still relies heavily on imports for high-tech components and its infrastructure compares poorly with China. International businesses increasingly use Vietnam as a strategic hub for accessing ASEAN markets and the wider region – a role the Vietnamese leadership continues to embrace and plans to expand on further. Vietnam faces geo-economic pressure from both Washington and Beijing as the two are locked in a contest for regional hegemony. International businesses must monitor closely how Hanoi responds to these pressures over time. State of Play Throughout the last 18 months, Vietnam has witnessed major political upheaval not seen for decades. An anti-corruption campaign led to the resignation of two presidents and high-ranking politicians, including Politburo members, as well as to hundreds of arrests and thousands of dismissals and reprimands. On 19 May, news broke that Nguyen Phu Trong, the General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) and driving force behind the anti-corruption campaign, passed away. The Politburo has appointed President To Lam, a former head of the country’s secret service, as interim party leader. He is also the likely successor to the party leadership after the next regular party congress in early 2026. While the power of the CPV remains uncontested and there are few signs of wider threats to domestic stability, considerably party frictions have emerged. Currently dominant in the power struggle is a faction of officials, led by Lam, with close ties to the country’s domestic security apparatus who seek to re-ideologize the CPV and strengthen the role of the party vis-à-vis state bureaucracy and society.   As one of the fastest growing economies focusing on export-driven growth, Vietnam is particularly vulnerable to geopolitical and geo-economic disruptions. It has thus put maintaining cordial relations with all major powers at the center of its so-called “bamboo diplomacy”. Specifically, it expanded bilateral relations with the United States and with U.S. allies such as Australia, Japan, and Korea as well as with Europe. At the same time, Hanoi maintained good relations with China despite maritime disputes in the South China Sea. It also reinforced its close relations with Russia, its largest arms vendor, not least by Russia’s President Vladimir Putin’s visit to Hanoi in June 2024. This includes its relations with the EU and its member states. The EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement has led to a huge expansion of economic ties, especially in exports by Vietnam to the EU in sectors such as textiles, footwear, electronics, and agricultural products (to a total of 47.6 bn Euro In 2023). Beyond economic ties and aid, however, EU-Vietnam relations have not progressed as quickly as imagined. Hanoi’s close ties with China and Russia have at times been at odds with the EU’s strategic interests. Moreover, concerns over the country’s abysmal human rights records, its violations of labour standards and intellectual property rights, endemic corruption, and slow progress in legal and administrative reforms have hampered closer cooperation. Key Issues A more assertive regional and geopolitical player Vietnam has profited substantially from current diversification trends, as even Chinese companies have diversified to Vietnam to circumvent export restrictions. So far, Hanoi has successfully maintained good bilateral relations with all major actors to sustain its high levels of economic growth. While increasing security and defense ties with America and its allies, Hanoi also strictly adheres to Beijing's "one China" principle, which claims Taiwan as an inalienable part of China. However, in the case of a Taiwan contingency its strong economic engagement with Taiwan plus the hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese citizens working on Taiwan would pose multiple simultaneous challenges for Vietnam. Hanoi has actively participated in ASEAN and associated multilateral forums, especially concerning issues revolving around the South China Sea. Its leadership also drives efforts toward an ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) as it seeks to profit from stronger trade and investment ties with other ASEAN states. Vietnam’s security and defense policy has been chiefly focused on its immediate neighbourhood rather than the wider region. The key issue for Vietnam’s leadership has been the South China Sea conflict, which it seeks to navigate primarily via diplomatic engagement. The CPV attempts to use its close ties to China’s leadership based on ideological affinity while also asserting its claims internationally based on international law. Nonetheless, Hanoi has itself militarized a number of islands and reefs it controls in the South China Sea and has made attempts to upgrade its navy and coastguard. The primary aim, besides providing illegal revenues through mark-ups and kickbacks for high-ranking military personnel, is for Vietnam to be able to “quietly” contest Chinese maritime expansionism in the South China Sea, in contrast to the Philippines more open confrontation. Yet, the official goal of modernizing the armed forces by 2030 has been effectively curtailed by budgetary constraints, mismanagement, and endemic corruption, and an earlier over-dependence on Russian arms exports which slowed to a trickle since 2022. Geoeconomics Vietnam is one of Asia’s most export-oriented economies and therefore very dependent on continued access to global trade and supply chains, as its high trade to GDP ratio shows. It has created a favourable environment for international companies seeking to establish manufacturing and export bases offering various incentives to foreign investors, including tax breaks, reduced tariffs, and simplified administrative procedures. Vietnam holds membership in all multilateral trade agreements (AFTA, CPTPP and RCEP) to enhance market access across the region, support regional supply chains and reduce tariffs. Its labour costs are low, with an average hourly wage at US$2.99 (VND 68.000) compared to China’s US$6.50. It thus has increasingly emerged as a regional alternative manufacturing hub to China in several sectors, such as textiles (boasting a well-established manufacturing infrastructure), footwear, and furniture making (particularly to the U.S.). Vietnam is also a major exporter of agricultural products such as coffee, cashew nuts, or seafood, effectively competing with China. In consumer electronics, the country has a growing sector with significant investments from Samsung and LG. However, while the country can handle assembly and some component manufacturing, it still relies on imports for high-tech components.   Challenges persist also in other sectors: In advanced electronics, Vietnam lacks the advanced semiconductor fabrication and high-tech component manufacturing capacity that China possesses. Its automotive industry is still developing, with some local assembly and component manufacturing successfully established, but unable to replace China’s established automotive manufacturing base. The same goes for machinery and heavy equipment as well as pharmaceuticals and chemicals. Also, much of the capital and the supply chains, as well as some of the infrastructure investments, that foster Vietnam’s growing clout are China-centric, so diversification to Vietnam does not necessarily mean reduced economic dependence on China.   Vietnam’s embrace of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), however, has been lukewarm due to general mistrust in China as well as past controversies with Chinese-funded infrastructure projects. Conversely China has afforded Vietnam a low level of priority within the BRI. Vietnam has actively courted other partners to develop its ageing infrastructure, most notably Japan and South Korea as well as international development banks. As part of its Global Gateway initiative, the EU is funding three major projects in the area of just energy transition as well as the development of a new metro line in Hanoi. US sanctions against China can be potentially undercut by re-routing supply chains via Vietnam, with the significant challenges and limitations mentioned above. Also, Vietnam may face geopolitical pressure from both the US and China regarding its role in circumventing sanctions. How Hanoi will respond to such pressures remains unclear given the current change in leadership.

Botschafter a.D. Dr. Peter Ammon ist ein ehemaliger Staatssekretär des Auswärtigen Amtes. Der promovierte Wirtschaftswissenschaftler war zuvor lange Jahre der Wirtschaftsdirektor des Auswärtigen Amtes und danach der deutsche Botschafter in Frankreich, im Vereinigten Königreich und in den USA. Ein Fokus seiner langen diplomatischen Karriere lag in der Unterstützung deutscher Unternehmen bei der Bewältigung der Herausforderungen durch die Globalisierung. In diesem Kontext unterstützte er als Sous-Sherpa über viele Jahre die Bundeskanzler Schröder und Merkel bei den G7/G8-Verhandlungen.   Seit Anfang 2024 ist Dr. Ammon Dean des Agora Strategy Institutes. Expertise USA, Großbritannien, Frankreich, Internationale Wirtschaftsbeziehungen und Exportkontrolle

Prof. Dr. Kai Andrejewski wechselt zu Agora Strategy: Experte für Kapitalmarkt- und Finanzstrategie stärkt Agora Strategy als führende geopolitische Unternehmensberatung   München, 05.11.2024 – Prof.   Dr. Kai Andrejewski , renommierter Finanzstratege und Kapitalmarktexperte, verstärkt ab sofort das Team der Agora Strategy Group AG  als Senior Partner . Mit seiner umfassenden Erfahrung als ehemaliger CFO der Sixt SE, langjähriger Bereichsvorstand bei KPMG sowie als Aufsichtsrat im Kapitalmarktumfeld wird er die geopolitische Strategieberatung dabei unterstützen, Unternehmen und CEOs weltweit an der Schnittstelle von Finanzstrategie und geopolitischen Risiken und Chancen zukunftssicher aufzustellen.   Hier bedient Agora Strategy einen wachsenden Bedarf an geopolitisch resilienten Kapital- und Finanzmarktstrategien . Die Kombination aus Kapitalmarktkompetenz und geopolitischer Expertise wird angesichts der wachsenden geopolitischen Risiken entscheidend. Diese Risiken beeinflussen den Zugang zu Kapital und die Finanzierungsbedingungen auf internationalen Märkten maßgeblich. Für Unternehmen wird es daher wichtiger, diese Faktoren in ihre strategischen Entscheidungen einzubeziehen, um langfristig erfolgreich zu bleiben.   Die Agora Strategy Group  ist führender Anbieter im Markt für geopolitische Strategieberatung. Zu den Dienstleistungen gehören neben Strategieentwicklung und Internationalisierung auch maßgeschneiderte Risikoanalysen, Business Development in komplexen Auslandsmärkten, globale Positionierungsstrategien sowie Regierungsberatung. In einer zunehmend vernetzten und komplexen Welt spielen geopolitische Entwicklungen eine entscheidende Rolle, die die Geschäftsstrategien von Unternehmen maßgeblich prägen. Zu den Kunden gehören führende DAX- und MDAX-Firmen, internationale Konzerne sowie der Mittelstand. Erst vor wenigen Monaten gab Agora Strategy eine umfassende strategische Partnerschaft mit Porsche Consulting bekannt.   Prof. Dr. Kai Andrejewski  bringt über 30 Jahre Erfahrung in den Bereichen Finanzstrategie, Wirtschaftsprüfung, Nachhaltigkeit und Unternehmensführung mit. Er greift auf fundierte Expertise in internationalen Kapitalmärkten zurück und wird diese nun in die geopolitische Beratung bei Agora Strategy einbringen, um Unternehmen beim Aufbau zukunftsfähiger und geopolitisch abgesicherter Finanzstrategien zu unterstützen.    Dr. Timo Blenk, Senior Partner, Agora Strategy: “Es ist mir eine große Freude, dass sich Dr. Andrejewski für uns entschieden hat! Damit gewinnen wir nicht nur einen internationalen Topmanager als Senior Partner, sondern stärken unsere Beratungskompetenz in einem strategisch wachsenden Bereich!”   Prof. Dr. Kai Andrewski, Senior Partner, Agora Strategy: „Ich freue mich, der geopolitischen Strategieberatung bei Agora Strategy eine neue Facette zu geben und CEOs, CFOs, Aufsichtsräte und Unternehmen dabei zu begleiten, wie geopolitische Entwicklungen ihre Finanzstrategien beeinflussen und, wie sie sich auf global veränderte Kapitalmärkte einstellen können!“ – Medienkontakt: Fabian Vetter +49 89 2153 693-32 +49 152 5106 9060 vetter@agora-strategy.com Über Agora Strategy: Agora Strategy ist ein geopolitisches Beratungsunternehmen, das 2015 als Spin-off der Münchner Sicherheitskonferenz von Botschafter a.D. Prof. Dr. h.c. Wolfgang Ischinger, Präsident des Stiftungsrats der Stiftung Münchner Sicherheitskonferenz, gegründet wurde. Agora Strategy ist spezialisiert auf politische Risikoanalysen, strategische Politikberatung und internationales Krisenmanagement. Die mehr als 300 Senior Advisors und Fellows von Agora Strategy, aus Politik, Diplomatie, Sicherheit und Verteidigung, Wirtschaft und Wissenschaft, sind weltweit, regional und lokal vernetzt. Auf Grundlage dieses einzigartigen Netzwerks bietet Agora Strategy mittelständischen und großen Unternehmen, Regierungen und multinationalen Institutionen maßgeschneiderte Beratungsleistungen. Agora Strategy hat seinen Hauptsitz in München und Büros in Berlin, Paris und Brüssel. www.agora-strategy.com

Dean’s Comment on the US Election by Ambassador (ret.) Dr. Peter Ammon Expect an unprecedented takeover of the U.S. administration  The unpredicted clarity of Donald Trump’s win including the Republican retaking of the Senate will make him an extremely powerful president. Moreover, he will enter office much better prepared than in 2017. A huge number of official positions will be cleared and filled with Trump followers. Especially if Republicans end the Senate filibuster, Trump will be able to put thousands of high-level nominees – and multiple judges over time – into office quickly. Should the party manage the “trifecta” by also winning the House (as is likely as of now), Republicans would have overall control of the legislative and executive branches. Given the existing conservative majority in the Supreme Court, America’s system of “checks and balances” would be greatly impaired. Trump 2.0 is a major political challenge with significant risks for business Domestic politics, especially the fight against his perceived “enemies”, will be at the forefront of President Trump’s agenda. Having survived not just actual assassination attempts but “political persecution” as he put it and emboldened by the Supreme Court’s decision on presidential immunity, he will feel vindicated to implement his promises. Moreover, his touted campaign against “wokeism” in the education system and media will add to the already existing division of the country in “Blue” and “Red” States. Foreign policy will become much more transactional than before, with Trump using America’s might to extract financial and strategic benefits from friends and foes alike. There will be no appetite to bear the burden for the upkeep of the international order. While he is unlikely to ultimately withdraw from NATO, the president will use the threat of doing so to force allies to shoulder a wider share of the cost. At the same time, there will be fewer US military interventions around the globe than under previous presidents. President Trump’s international instrument of choice are economic and financial sanctions, under the assumption that the cost is borne by others. The self-styled “tariff man” may use executive orders or invoke the International Emergency Economic Powers Act to quickly adopt high tariffs on China (at anything between 60 and 100%) and universal tariffs of possibly 10% on all imports. Even though the latter would likely be challenged in courts, Trump's actions alone would cause havoc on the international markets while legal action would take months to proceed. By and large, President Trump will remain unpredictable, which in itself will intimidate his partners. The world order, already heavily fragmented, will become more volatile and dangerous. In particular, major changes can be expected in the following policy areas: Taxes and Budget A further reduction of corporate tax from 21% to 15%, while Trump also promised to make the 2017 income tax reductions permanent. An end to some of Biden's tax credits (green energy), while allowing the deduction of local taxes from federal tax bills. $7.5 trillion added to the US deficit, which could rise from almost 6% to 8% of GDP under Trump, creating a risk for fiscal and financial stability in the long term. Immigration A much more rigorous turn in immigration policies, even if the promised mass deportation (of up to 15 million undocumented foreigners) is not likely to succeed. Further restrictions of legal pathways to enter the United States, such as bringing back family separation policies, forcing asylum seekers to remain in Mexico during their process, and slowing down visa application procedures. Climate and Energy Another withdrawal from the Paris Climate Convention, giving international efforts to fight climate change a huge blow. Complete termination of all Biden policies (e.g. the CHIPS Act, the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), the Infrastructure Law) is unlikely, as these over proportionally benefit Republican states and districts. However, specific subsidies such as tax credits for EVs could be revoked and he could make it harder to spend money in Blue States. A slowing down of decarbonization efforts with fresh investment in fossil fuels and reduced support for green energy, even though investments in the energy transition that are already underway cannot realistically be revoked overnight. National Defense Higher defense expenditures with bipartisan support in Congress. Republican leaders have already called for a spending increase to 5% of GDP (today: $874 billion, or 3% of GDP). The cost of modernizing the nuclear forces alone is estimated at $750 billion over the next decades. More funds are needed and will likely be approved to secure supply chains, increase munition production, strengthen the industrial base and rebuild deterrence against China's rising capabilities. The Wars in the Middle East Despite Trump’s repeated criticism of President Biden’s efforts to restrain Israel's military actions, he is unlikely to authorize US involvement in military engagement against nuclear facilities in Iran. Yet dimmer prospects for a two-state solution, as Trump and his advisors have been outspoken supporters of the current Israeli government in general and the settler movement in particular. Russia’s War against Ukraine While Trump's rhetoric on Ukraine has been inconsistent, he will try to force an end to the war early on, not least to gain him the laurels of the peace maker. This will most likely mean forcing Ukraine to accept territorial concessions. US lawmakers generally are increasingly opposed to aid Ukraine, so US action will heavily depend on whether Trump will empower internationalists like his former secretary of state Mike Pompeo or ideological isolationists like Vice President-elect J.D. Vance. In any case, the Europeans will have to bear a larger share of the cost of war. China Strong bipartisan support for hawkish action vis-à-vis China, the three top issues being the deterrence of conflict with the US or in the South China Sea, the protection of US critical infrastructure and shunning cheap exports from industrial overcapacity in China. An actual decoupling of the US economy from China is in the offing, as Trump supports high tariffs and export restrictions that could easily trigger a trade war. China, already plagued by deflation, will find its export-led growth business model in dire straits, with two potential remedies: stimulating domestic consumption (good for European exporters) and re-directing surplus exports towards other parts of the world (bad for production in Europe). The Consequences from a European Business Perspective One of the lessons from Trump’s first term in office was to not be too afraid of his words, but to carefully watch what he does. European governments will have to adjust to the returning president’s transactional style, which only respects strength and tries to exploit (perceived) weaknesses. The dream of unfettered global trade and free movement of people as part of a just global order built on Western values and defended by US military might has ended. A second Trump presidency “on steroids” could therefore produce a much-needed push to re-invigorate the process of European integration. Given that the deepening of the EU has mostly been possible only in times of crisis, prepare for fresh moves in this field. Companies depending on the US market will come under fresh pressure to substitute their exports to America with local production there. New immigration policies will make it harder to find the human resources needed, and proper due diligence may be advised in which state (red or blue) the FDI might find its best location. For traders and investors, it will become more difficult to predict future US dollar exchange rates. With the US fiscal deficit heading for the sky, inflation may come back, and the Fed could be forced to increase interest rates and/or return to buying government papers (known as quantitative easing). With America sucking in global savings, interest rates all over the world may rise. Trump, however, has made it clear that he wants low interest rates and a weak dollar. Companies, trading with and investing in the US, may wish to internally hedge their trade and financial flows.