In dem Agora Strategy Group Geopolitik-Podcast „The Future of Power“ lädt Dr. Timo Blenk (CEO), monatlich Entscheidungsträger aus Diplomatie, Wirtschaft, Politik und Militär ein, um aktuelle geopolitische Entwicklungen zu diskutieren. Über die Einflüsse dieser zu informieren und fundierte Entscheidungsgrundlagen zu schaffen, ist der Kern dieses Projekts.   Diesen Monat zu Gast ist Prof. Jörg Rocholl, PhD, Präsident der ESMT Berlin und Vorsitzender des Beirats des deutschen Bundesfinanzministeriums! In der 28ten Folge unseres Podcasts sprechen Dr. Blenk und Prof. Rocholl über Geoökonomie und die Zukunft der deutschen Wirtschaft!   Die wichtigsten Themen des Monats Trump(onomics): Zölle, akademische Freiheit & Rechtssicherheit Neue Partnerschaften: Indien & eine deutsche Chinastrategie Wirtschaftswunder 2.0: zwischen Resilienz, Bürokratieabbau & Chancen      Hausmitteilungen   Alle weiteren Folgen des Podcasts Agora Strategy Webauftritt Agora Strategy bei LinkedIn Aktuelle Projekte & Veranstaltungen des Agora-Strategy-Teams Agora Strategy Executive Briefing: The Geopolitics of AI Agora Strategy Institute Executive Mitgliedschaft Unser COO, Fabian Vetter im brandeins Magazin Agora Strategy Risk Report 2025 Sie finden unseren Podcast mit Untertiteln auch auf Youtube: https://youtu.be/IRBDHaYG84s

Auswirkungen Trumps Außenpolitik auf Europa Download des Reports: Zusammenfassung Das unsichere geopolitische Umfeld birgt erhebliche wirtschaftliche Risiken für Deutschland und Europa und verschlechtert das Investitionsklima in zentralen Weltregionen . Besonders schwer wiegt das Risiko eines Handelskrieges zwischen den USA und China . Die Gewalteskalation im Nahen Osten hat die wirtschaftlichen Möglichkeiten, die sich aus den Abraham-Abkommen sowie der Initiative eines Wirtschaftskorridors Indien-Naher Osten-Europa ergeben haben, bis auf Weiteres verbaut. Das betrifft u.a. die Erschließung grüner Energien. Die zweite Amtszeit von US-Präsident Donald Trump bringt erhebliche Unwägbarkeiten über den künftigen sicherheitspolitischen Kurs der Vereinigten Staaten. Dies gilt insbesondere für den weiteren Verlauf des Ukrainekriegs und die Spannungen rund um Taiwan. Trumps außen- und sicherheitspolitischen Ansatz prägt ein fundamentaler Widerspruch : Einerseits propagiert er internationales Engagement im Sinne von „Frieden durch Stärke“, das sich stark auf militärische und wirtschaftliche Machtmittel stützt. Andererseits hat er den Wählerinnen und Wählern versprochen, die USA künftig aus Kriegen und Konflikten herauszuhalten. Trumps bisherige Personalentscheidungen für die außenpolitischen Posten seiner Administration deuten keine isolationistische Wende in der US-Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik, sondern eher einen robusten Internationalismus an. Dieser nimmt gleichwohl kaum Rücksicht auf multilaterale Institutionen oder die Interessen der Bündnispartner. Die Erosion liberal-demokratischer Prinzipien wird sich während der zweiten Trump-Administration noch einmal verstärken. Dabei dürfte der Versuch der Aufweichung demokratischer Beschränkungen im Innern mit einer abnehmenden machtpolitischen Selbstbeschränkung der USA auf internationaler Ebene einhergehen. Diese Entwicklung betrifft besonders die NATO mit ihrem demokratischen Wertefundament und Entscheidungsprozessen. Eine Chance für eine kurz- und mittelfristige sicherheitspolitische Entspannung bietet sich gleich zu Beginn der zweiten Amtszeit mit Blick auf Waffenstillstände bzw. ein Interim-Abkommen zur Beendigung der Kriege in Gaza und der Ukraine . In beiden Fällen zeichnet sich bislang jedoch keine Perspektive für eine langfristige Stabilisierung bzw. gar Lösung der zugrundeliegenden Konflikte ab. Das sicherheitspolitische Umfeld in Europa, im Indopazifik sowie im Nahen Osten ist in den letzten Jahren deutlich volatiler geworden. China, Russland und Iran haben erhebliche Rüstungsanstrengungen unternommen und zugleich ihre militärische Zusammenarbeit intensiviert. Aus ihrer Sicht besteht derzeit eine Gelegenheit, die bestehenden regionalen und internationalen Ordnungen auch mit Gewalt zu revidieren . Allerdings zeigt das Beispiel Iran, dass revisionistische Staaten ihre eigenen Fähigkeiten auch überschätzen können. Handlungsempfehlungen für Unternehmen finden Sie im Report (Download siehe oben)

Rohstoffpolitik statt Klimaschutz Download des Reports: Zusammenfassung Die neue US-Administration fokussiert sich unerwartet stark auf fossile Brennstoffe : Sie hat den „Energienotstand“ ausgerufen, um Genehmigungen für neue Flüssiggasterminals zu beschleunigen und Auflagen für Öl- und Gasbohrungen zu lockern. Gleichzeitig fährt sie die Förderung grüner Energien zurück  und könnte den Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) demontieren: Als CO2-arme Energien und Technologien sind nur noch Kernenergie, die auch für Fracking genutzte Geothermie und neuste Batterietechnik förderfähig. Das angekündigte Streichen von Klimasubventionen und Aufheben von Schutz-vorschriften würde den Rückgang der US-Emissionen in den kommenden Jahren verlangsamen : Statt wie geplant um 37 Prozent wären es nur 25 Prozent bis 2030 gegenüber dem Basisjahr 2005. Eine Reihe multinationaler Unternehmen   überdenken  bereits ihre Investitionen  in erneuerbare Energien und den grünen Technologiesektor in den USA, während zahlreiche Maßnahmen der Regierung vor Gericht angefochten werden. Von der Rückkehr der USA zu fossilen Brennstoffen profitiert China  als führende Supermacht für erneuerbare Energietechnologien und in der Elektromobilität. Bei Rohstoffen , die für die Energiewende und für militärische Anwendungen wichtig sind, geht die US-Regierung aggressiv  vor: Ein Staatsfonds soll durch Investitionen in ausländische Bergwerke und politischen Druck den Zugang zum mineralienreichen Grönland und zu Seltenen Erden in der Ukraine ermöglichen. Der von Präsident Donald Trump erklärte erneute Austritt aus dem Pariser Klimaschutz-Abkommen  ist vor allem symbolisch, da die US-Energiepolitik auch unter seinem Vorgänger primär wirtschaftlich motiviert war. Auch beträgt der amerikanische Anteil nur etwa 11 Prozent der weltweiten Emissionen. Allerdings könnten andere Länder wie Argentinien oder Indonesien dem Beispiel folgen. Das Einfrieren  sämtlicher US-Zahlungen für internationale Hilfe, insbesondere die Auflösung der Entwicklungshilfebehörde USAID, hat auch Auswirkungen auf die weltweite Förderung CO2-armer Energie . So werden beispielsweise derzeit keine Solarprojekte in der Ukraine oder Afrika mehr von den USA unterstützt. Schließlich schaffen die angekündigten US-Zölle nicht nur Unsicherheit bei Unternehmen , sondern machen auch eine europäisch-amerikanische Zusammenarbeit  im Klimabereich, beispielsweise im Rahmen gemeinsamer Maßnahmen zum CO2-Grenzausgleich,  zunichte . Handlungsempfehlungen für Unternehmen finden Sie im Report (Download siehe oben)

In dem Agora Strategy Group Geopolitik-Podcast „The Future of Power“ lädt Dr. Timo Blenk (CEO), monatlich Entscheidungsträger aus Diplomatie, Wirtschaft, Politik und Militär ein, um aktuelle geopolitische Entwicklungen zu diskutieren. Über die Einflüsse dieser zu informieren und fundierte Entscheidungsgrundlagen zu schaffen, ist der Kern dieses Projekts.   Diesen Monat teilen zwei in-house Experten des Agora Strategy Institutes, Botschafter a.D. Dr. Peter Ammon und Dr. Cornelius Adebahr, ihre Analysen! In der 27ten Folge unseres Podcasts sprechen Dr. Blenk und Botschafter a.D. Dr. Ammon sowie Dr. Adebahr über die aktuellen Entwicklungen in den USA und die Effekte dieser auf die Welt!   Die wichtigsten Themen des Monats Die USA im Wandel: Trumpnomics, Ideologie & autokratische Tendenzen Das Spiel der Großmacht: Stärke, verlorene Softpower und die Kunst des "Deals" Und Europa? Von neuen Allianzen und alten Fragen nach Atomwaffen     Hausmitteilungen   Alle weiteren Folgen des Podcasts Agora Strategy Webauftritt Agora Strategy bei LinkedIn Aktuelle Projekte & Veranstaltungen des Agora-Strategy-Teams Unser COO, Fabian Vetter im brandeins Magazin Agora Strategy Risk Report 2025 Agora Strategy Institute Executive Mitgliedschaft Dean's Comment: Dr. Peter Ammon zu Trumps Comeback Sie finden unseren Podcast mit Untertiteln auch auf Youtube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J1rgypOzy2o

Agora Strategy Executive Briefing on US policy reversal Executive Summary The current dynamic between Russia and the United States is likely to have negative short-term consequences for Ukraine but is unlikely to overcome deep-rooted mistrust of the West or structural economic problems in Russia. If the Trump administration's goal is to coax Russia out of its partnership with China, it risks misjudging the latter’s solidity, leaving Washington vulnerable to being manipulated by Russia. Irrespective of its specifics, a U.S.-Russia deal on Ukraine will have far-reaching consequences for great power relations across the globe, including for China’s stance on Taiwan and the potential nuclearization of Japan and South Korea. Implications for International Business Trump’s unprecedented advances to Putin do not change the Russian economy’s fundamental dynamics and risks. Businesses should exercise caution and avoid prematurely reconfiguring their investment approach towards the Russian market and supply chain strategies based solely on the current diplomatic dynamics. Companies should focus on maintaining diverse supply sources, identifying new avenues for acquiring raw materials and rare earth elements, and developing robust strategies to mitigate the risks posed by escalating trade wars – and, potentially, new military conflicts. State of Play America making advances to Russia at Ukraine’s cost The apparent recalibration of American-Russian relations continues with neck-breaking speed. In fact, U.S. President Donald Trump is keen to meet his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, considered a pariah in the West until recently after his assault on Ukraine, without receiving any concessions. Yet, a genuine thaw is by no means guaranteed, as both sides have drastically different expectations: While Russia wants U.S. acquiescence on the expansion of its sphere of influence in Europe, beginning with maximalist demands on Ukraine, the Trump administration wants to use Russia in its confrontation with China, peeling off the Sino-Russian relationship to isolate Beijing. Until both parties realize the limits of their rapprochement, actual alignment will be difficult – and many initiatives will rather cause frustration. The short-term effect on Ukraine of this potentially long-term realignment will largely depend on how President Volodymyr Zelensky can navigate his personal relationship with Trump. The latter has suspended and then reinstated military and intelligence assistance to Ukraine, underscoring his incalculability and his ruthlessness. The threat of another holdup, even if not felt immediately on the battlefield, will hang over the coming negotiations. Under any scenario, the main – if not sole – burden of supporting Ukraine is now on Europe's shoulders. China, in contrast is capitalizing on the US-European divide to steer the EU away from a confrontational stance in their relations.   Key Issues Geopolitical implications for Europe and the world The resumption of direct negotiations holds greater significance for Russia than for the United States. Moscow stands to gain several strategic advantages: a widening rift between Washington and its European allies, potential leverage over Ukraine, and a restored superpower status no longer isolated by the West. While Trump himself may see a gain in projecting the image of a peacemaker, this is largely symbolic. More concerning is the – not yet confirmed – assumption that his goal is the subjugation of Europe, no longer “whole and free”, under the thumb of two global powers. The pressure on European capitals, nonetheless, is real: If, over the past decade or so, Russia and China sought to divide Europe, now the United States is in that game, too.   As a first step, Washington will attempt to impose a 'peace deal' on Ukraine, with little European and involuntary Ukrainian involvement. While this may not fully satisfy Russia's objectives, a ceasefire combined with the lack of robust security guarantees for Ukraine and a forced leadership change in Kyiv would give Moscow enough of a victory and provide it with a pause to rebuild its military capabilities for future action. The bigger picture revolves around Trump’s alleged ‘reverse-Kissinger’ strategy, i.e. the attempt to isolate China by cozying to Russia. However, despite sending soft signals, Moscow will not abandon Beijing; rather, it will try to outplay Trump.   In fact, China’s strategic importance for Russia cannot be overestimated. Going far beyond shared grievances about U.S. dominance, there are solid reasons for close Sino-Russian partnership: a long mutual border, economic compatibility, and non-democratic regime characteristics. Moreover, in the last three years, Russia has become highly dependent on China, which accounts for 40 percent of its imports and 30 percent of its exports. Reversing this economic dependence would require coordinated efforts by Americans and Europeans to increase bilateral trade with Russia, which is hard to envisage even under a pro-Russian Trump approach. At the same time, certain aspects of Trump’s handling of the war in Ukraine could be incorporated into a broader Sino-American agreement, including on Taiwan. Given his transactional, business-oriented approach to foreign policy, he might turn U.S. support for the self-governing island into a bargaining chip to secure concessions from China on other matters, such as reduced tariffs on American products, eased market access for U.S. companies, or commitments to increase imports of American produce. Concretely, Beijing might halt its investigations of companies like Google or agree to specific quantities of U.S. agricultural imports, as during the first trade war.   The consequences of such an unprecedented move would be far-reaching, ending any semblance of U.S. security guarantees in East Asia. This would push states like Japan and South Korea to ponder immediate nuclearization to establish a deterrent. Still, the demise of the rules-based, liberal world order need not be definitive. Although international institutions struggle with global conflicts, they maintain a role in regulating state behavior, as the continued pretense of democratic legitimacy by nations like Russia and China underscores.   At global level, China will double down on its display as an anchor of stability compared to America under Trump. Its emergence as the primary provider of financial resources, coupled with its expanding global presence, will translate its economic leverage into political influence. Especially smaller countries in the Global South are likely to seek closer ties with Beijing, while middle powers will strive to avoid being caught in the superpower confrontation. European countries will need to adapt to this new reality by proactively engaging with China in third countries. At the same time, all countries will have to adjust to the new great power rules, from economic sanctions to imposed conflict resolution to outrights threats. This will foster regionalization, as middle powers seek a distance from conflictual power dynamics and establish regional frameworks with other states. The geoeconomics of a ceasefire and sanctions relief While a partial easing of U.S. sanctions against Russia is possible, complete removal remains improbable. Not only will Washington want to retain some leverage over the Kremlin; some sanctions have indeed been enshrined by Congress and are therefore difficult to undo. Nor is pressuring the EU to lift sanctions likely to succeed. Ukraine's economic recovery, in turn, will be severely challenged by the widespread damage to critical infrastructure. Moreover, a cessation of hostilities could trigger the eruption of social grievances that have been largely ignored or suppressed during the war.   Even if Trump manages to reach a deal with Putin, it will not significantly affect economic integration or competition in Eurasia. Russia has proven to be a state with a hazardous investment climate. Its economy, structurally transformed over the past three years, cannot easily return to pre-war conditions: Its dependence on China and on its own military industry, tied to the war against Ukraine, will remain significant. New laws and realities allow the Kremlin to seize the assets of any investor, even those who previously had guarantees from powerful figures. So, while Russia will continue to integrate its economy with countries it considers friendly, it will face problems since even China is reluctant to invest in unstable economies.   Even with an unexpected warming of U.S.-Russia political relations, the fundamental negative trends will remain. Europe should focus on diversifying suppliers, strengthening economic resilience, ensuring access to critical raw materials and rare earth elements, and formulating strategies to withstand new trade wars. To prepare, companies should invest in technologies that improve supply chain and agility and proactively seek partnerships with diverse nations to broaden their supplier base. Investments in defense industrial base and deterrence capabilities will also be crucial to safeguard peace in Europe. Businesses should also expect greater volatility of the major powers’ currencies, first and foremost the U.S. dollar, as well as of the U.S. stock market. Given China’s and Russia’s efforts to create tools for undermining American sanctions, including trade in national currencies, alternative payment systems, and mechanisms for sanctions evasion, companies should examine their current exposure to the U.S. dollar and the Chinese yuan. They should experiment with other currencies and payment hubs depending on their major export markets – tough costly, these measures help them prepare for further fragmentation of the global financial system.

Agora Strategy Institute Commentary on interdependence of European companies with the United States The return of President Donald Trump to the White House has sent shockwaves through international politics and global markets. At the same time, his “wood chopper” approach to U.S. institutions threatens the very domestic recovery he promised to his voters. Already, his approval ratings have stumbled as inflation is heating up again.   While the deliberate whirlwind of executive orders, press statements, and social media announcements rarely leaves a moment to pause and reflect, Trump’s address to Congress on Tuesday provided yet another warning: Businesses around the world must be prepared for a comprehensive restructuring of the global economic, financial and security order. In just a few short weeks, his administration has already implemented sweeping changes that are reshaping diplomatic alliances, economic policies, and global trade dynamics, thus destroying almost all good will and global soft power America had enjoyed for so long.   While alignment with Russia on European security and the Ukraine war may be the most profound disruption, his tariff-wielding approach to trade and his declared intent to pocket resources and infrastructure as he pleases, from Greenland to Panama shake-up the business world. From imposing 25% tariffs on steel and aluminum imports, to imposing trade restrictions on Mexico, Canada, and China and announcing tariffs on European goods within a month, the damage to business confidence, visible on the stock market, has already been done. Moreover, with the U.S. fiscal deficit becoming more and more unsustainable and counter-measures looming from trading partners, it is quite possible that Trumponomics will fail spectacularly and end in global stagflation.   These developments have created a volatile environment for businesses, governments, and international institutions. As protectionist policies take center stage, the transatlantic relationship faces renewed strain, with Europe grappling to maintain its economic interdependence with the United States while accommodating stark political divergences. The widening gap is problematic This widening gap between US politics and transatlantic business practices is problematic because it undermines the stability and predictability essential for robust trade. Protectionism and populism both create regulatory uncertainties that disrupt established supply chains and trigger sudden tariff hikes or policy shifts. Such volatility erodes mutual trust and hampers the economic interdependence that has long been a cornerstone of global prosperity, ultimately stifling innovation and growth on both sides of the Atlantic. The consequences of these political divergences are tangible for businesses US companies operating in Europe now confront a fragmented regulatory landscape with stringent data protection rules, higher environmental and labor standards, and other measures that differ sharply from the more market-oriented approach in America. These discrepancies result in higher compliance costs, increased legal uncertainties, and the risk of retaliatory trade measures that can disrupt established supply chains. Meanwhile, European businesses face the threat of abrupt US policy shifts and protectionist measures that unsettle longstanding trade flows and alter market dynamics. This imbalance can increase operational risks and raise barriers to efficient cross-Atlantic commerce.   To navigate these challenges on a political level, a balanced, pragmatic European approach that leverages robust diplomacy without compromising core values is needed. Instead of reacting impulsively to every provocative headline—a tactic that only plays into Trump’s strategy of manufacturing crises for media dominance—political and business leaders should focus on presenting accurate data and long-term strategies that help diminish the impact of manufactured controversies.   A key element in this strategy is the reinforcement of internal cohesion. The EU’s single market of 450 million consumers offers a strong foundation; initiatives like the Digital Single Market and the Capital Markets Union streamline compliance requirements and reduce bureaucratic red tape, creating a stable and predictable environment that attracts American investments. European businesses can take several concrete steps to adapt By investing in local partnerships and forming joint ventures with American firms, they can better understand and navigate the US regulatory framework while fostering lasting goodwill among local stakeholders. Diversifying supply chains and exploring alternative export markets, even as they maintain strong ties with the US for example at state level, can mitigate the risks associated with sudden regulatory changes or tariff hikes. Moreover, by investing in advanced compliance systems and developing dedicated legal teams to monitor policy shifts in real time, European companies can enhance their regulatory agility and adapt quickly to new challenges.   International business councils also have a crucial advisory role to play in this environment. They offer platforms for cooperation and knowledge sharing, acting as essential intermediaries that bridge the gap between divergent political climates and the practical realities of cross-Atlantic commerce. These councils facilitate regular dialogue among industry leaders and policymakers, helping to ensure that private sector concerns are considered in legislative processes, which in turn contributes to a more predictable regulatory environment. Investment carries risks However, increased investment in the United States also carries risks, as European companies may face increased regulatory scrutiny (if not occasional discrimination) and legal barriers there. The administration's focus on America First policies and “deal-making” could lead to the arbitrary enforcement of regulations. This creates an uneven playing field for foreign investors and an operating environment for European industry that does not guarantee fair business practices or tangible benefits. Instead, this environment may lead to increased dependency, compliance costs and potential litigation.   Outside of the US market, the administration’s ending of dis-encouraging American companies to use bribes in third countries is a worrying warning sign of more reckless competition in markets that European companies may turn to in search for alternatives to the US market. There is no size-fits-all solution, but options to prepare In the current climate of political divergence and protectionist policies, there is no one-size-fits-all solution. Instead, increased vigilance, sober long-term cost-benefit calculations, and an openness to react quickly and decisively are key factors for the way ahead. In addition, maintaining open channels of communication with policymakers is crucial. In order to influence the strategies of EU member states and the Commission to counter Trump’s policies, companies should make their voices heard in the European political arena.   Staying informed about both U.S. and EU regulatory developments allows businesses to anticipate and adapt to changes promptly. Given the current uncertainties, a thorough assessment of the risks associated with U.S. investments is imperative to ensure informed decision-making and strategic resilience.

In dem Agora Strategy Geopolitik-Podcast „The Future of Power“ lädt Dr. Timo Blenk (CEO), monatlich Entscheidungsträger aus Diplomatie; Wirtschaft; Politik und Militär ein, um aktuelle geopolitische Entwicklungen zu diskutieren. Über die Einflüsse dieser zu informieren und fundierte Entscheidungsgrundlagen zu schaffen, ist der Kern dieses Projekts. In dieser 26. Folge spricht Dr. Timo Blenk mit Alexander Gabuev, Direktor des Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center, über den Krieg in der Ukraine, die chinesisch-russische Zusammenarbeit und eine mögliche Antwort des Westens. Die wichtigsten Themen des Monats Kristallkugel: Ukraine-Krieg und darüber hinaus Machtdynamik im Kreml: Der Bär behält die Kontrolle Die chinesisch-russische Partnerschaft: ein geopolitischer Wandel im Entstehen Eisige Winde in der Arktis: Akteure, Interessen und Zusammenarbeit Vorhanden, aber schwer zu quantifizieren: Russische Einmischung in westliche Demokratien   Hausmitteilungen   Alle weiteren Folgen des Podcasts Agora Strategy Webauftritt Agora Strategy bei LinkedIn Aktuelle Projekte & Veranstaltungen des Agora-Strategy-Teams Agora Strategy Risk Report 2025 Agora Strategy Institute Executive Mitgliedschaft Dean's Comment: Dr. Peter Ammon zu Trumps Comeback Sie finden unseren Podcast mit Untertiteln auch auf Youtube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J1rgypOzy2o

Agora Strategy Executive Briefing on EU climate industrial policies Executive Summary The geopolitical context with an incoming tariff-wielding US administration and a sluggish-but-combative China as well as domestic politics in member states require the EU to combine decarbonization with competitiveness and security. Within 100 days after assuming office on December 1, the European Commission is expected to present a “Clean Industrial Deal” to harmonize current climate and energy policies with competitiveness, industry and growth objectives. The fragmentation of the single market, high energy prices, the far-right backlash on climate policy, as well as potential tariffs from the US put at risk Europe’s economic model and its current decarbonization path. Implications for International Business Several EU measures and investments will incentivize clean tech industries such as offshore wind, semiconductors, electrolysers, electric vehicles (EVs), and heat pumps, and support other sectors to decarbonize like steel, cement and aluminum. The planned ‘Clean Trade and Investment Partnerships’ to secure supply chains relevant to the green transition, such as for critical raw materials, is likely to include investment opportunities, in particular with producer countries. Given the prospect of increased US tariffs, European firms should prepare for a more politicized, regionalized and protectionist international market environment. Rather than looking for special deals, they should advocate for an EU response that respects rules-based trade to benefit the overall European economy. State of Play From European Green Deal to Clean Industrial Deal Under the umbrella term of the European Green Deal, the EU passed a number of policy initiatives over the past five years to reach its climate target of “net zero” by 2050. These included the Fitfor55 legislative package, a reform of the Emissions Trading System (ETS), and new emission standards for cars. The EU has also ‘greened’ trade through instruments such as the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) and the EU deforestation regulation (EUDR). This approach is here to stay: European climate law is legally binding, and decision-makers at the highest level – including re-elected Commission President Ursula von der Leyen – have vowed to continue the EU’s decarbonization path.   What will change, however, is that EU climate policy will adapt to the geopolitical context and to alleviate current economic woes. Member states governments have little to no appetite for ambitious new initiatives, due to populist pressure, high energy prices driving up the cost of living and decreasing competitiveness, and security issues, especially Russia’s continued war in Ukraine in conjunction with the potential withdrawal of the US security umbrella in Europe. In addition, external climate tools, such as EUDR and CBAM, have been heavily criticized by developing countries for stymying trade with the EU.   Therefore, both the outstanding implementation of existing legislation and any new proposals will focus on making the green transition more compatible with Europe’s global competitiveness and need for “strategic autonomy”. Within the first 100 days, the Commission will present a Competitiveness Compass, to include proposals on boosting innovation to close the gap with the United States, the Clean Industrial Deal, and economic security initiatives, such as international Clean Trade and Investment Partnerships. This package will tackle vulnerabilities in supply chains and rebalance the Green Deal’s initial supply-side tilt. It also aims to deepen the single market and strengthen competitiveness, as suggested in the EU’s most recent reform reports. Key Issues Finance and market prospects of clean industrial policy The Clean Industrial Deal is expected to propose a range of policy initiatives, starting with a reform of carbon pricing and energy market design. It will also promote more electrification through a scheme called Carbon Contracts for Difference, a stronger integration of energy markets, and measures to support the clean tech sector. A single market for CO2 should help to decarbonize basic industry sectors like steel and cement. The Commission is further likely to introduce local production requirements in public procurement contracts to incentivize companies to manufacture in Europe. On the funding side, the Clean Industrial Deal is likely to include a new European Competitiveness Fund to complement existing tools such as the European Investment Fund or Important Projects of Common European Interest.   Two main obstacles stand in the way of such a policy: First, member states tend to protect national industries, such as Berlin wanting to produce green steel in Germany, even though this would be more cost efficient in Southern Spain or Sweden. A temporary abrogation of state aid rules during the Covid-19 pandemic mostly benefitted the bigger member states and has led to a detrimental fragmentation of the single market, which the incoming Commission will seek to rectify. It will also overhaul EU competition policy, which primarily focuses on the single market and does not sufficiently consider unfair competition from outside. Instead, it will have to balance support for strategic sectors – e.g. infrastructure, semiconductors, defence, energy and clean tech sectors – while ensuring fair and healthy competition within the single market. Second, funding will be controversial. The Commission is likely to try to leverage new debt after the successful NextGenerationEU package of 750 bn EUR in 2020, which runs out in 2026. So, national governments have to decide about giving the EU enough fiscal leverage to strategically invest in the European economy. Three elements are to be considered: The upcoming negotiations for the next EU budget (2028-34); increasing the EU’s own resources (despite political standstill over the past two years); and the establishment of the capital markets union in order to raise private capital for the transition. Despite these hurdles, the Competitiveness Compass could prove essential to keep key innovations, technology, industries and jobs in Europe as the continent expects to be ‘squeezed’ by the increasing rivalry between the US and China. Geopolitical issues and implications As China heavily subsidises green-tech industries such as wind, solar panels and EVs, the US started to massively invest in its green transition under the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA). These industrial policies have distorted the global level playing field and created unfair advantages for American and Chinese businesses, to which the Clean Industrial Deal aims to provide a commensurate response. Beyond such strategy, however, both China and the US will be less friendly trading partners. Chinese overcapacity is already flooding markets, while the next US President is expected to impose a randomly chosen tariff on EU-made goods, possibly even on specific member states (in disregard of, but with effects for, the single market). Domestically, he promised to extend the tax credits of his first term and to subsidise fossil fuel companies. While foreign-owned companies, including European ones, had access to the IRA until now, the subsidy splurge per se is protectionist in nature and therefore disadvantageous to the European economy. Firms should also be wary of potential pressures from the US administration on data protection and privacy rules in the EU.   In terms of free trade agreements (FTAs), the EU will try to conclude still open negotiations, most importantly with Mercosur, but also with India, Indonesia, or the Philippines. After successfully adding climate concerns to the draft FTAs, it is now domestic populist instrumentalization that risks blocking EU trade deals in the future – as French and Polish opposition to the EU-Mercosur agreement shows. The new Clean Trade and Investment Partnerships will regroup certain existing instruments, for instance on critical raw materials. However, they are not legally binding and have to chime with the EU’s diplomatic and development tools, especially Global Gateway, to secure long-term access to relevant raw materials and technology and to strengthen supply chains.   Lastly, businesses should prepare for the application of the CBAM and the newly reformed ETS, which will include buildings and road and transport in the coming years. Moreover, a simplification of the rules and cutting of red tape is in the offing, without implying deregulation and less standards. In addition, firms are advised to also follow the national implementation, as governments often add administrative burdens to the initial EU legislation, a practice known as ‘gold-plating’. This was the case for funds within the Common Agricultural Policy and the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive and is likely to happen again with the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive.

Auswirkungen der US-Wahlen auf die europäische Wirtschaft Download des Reports: Zusammenfassung Derzeit ist der Ausgang der Präsidentschaftswahl in den USA am 5. November noch völlig offen. Die Nominierung von Vizepräsidentin Kamala Harris als Kandidatin der Demokratischen Partei hat den Wahlkampf neu belebt. Harris und ihr Gegenkandidat, der frühere Präsident Donald Trump, liegen in landesweiten Umfragen ebenso wie in den wichtigen Swing States weitgehend gleichauf und haben somit beide eine realistische Chance auf den Wahlsieg. Die Republikaner haben in den Umfragen für die Kongresswahlen weiterhin einen kleinen Vorsprung in beiden Kammern und werden das Repräsentantenhaus voraussichtlich mit knappem Vorsprung halten. Allerdings erhöhen Harris‘ Kandidatur sowie ein wachsender Trend zum Stimmensplitting die Chancen der demokratischen Kandidaten und könnten in einem engen Rennen für Überraschungen sorgen. Ungeachtet des Wahlergebnisses wird sich die nächste US-Administration noch intensiver auf innenpolitische Herausforderungen konzentrieren. Dabei stehen insbesondere die weitere Stärkung der heimischen Industrie , die Reduzierung von Abhängigkeiten von China und eine kritische Haltung gegenüber Freihandel und Globalisierung im Fokus. Die Wahl von Trump würde die Wiederaufnahme von politischen Maßnahmen und Zielen aus seiner ersten Amtszeit bedeuten: niedrigere Steuern, weniger Regulierung, Förderung der Industrieproduktion, Zurückdrehen der Klimapolitik , stärkere Unterstützung von Erdöl- und Erdgasgewinnung in den USA und ein eher transaktionales und merkantilistisches Konzept für Handel und Sicherheit, u. a. im Hinblick auf den Umgang mit Bündnispartnern. Mit dem Slogan einer „Opportunity Economy“ konzentrieren sich die wirtschaftlichen Vorschläge von Harris zwar auch auf die Innenpolitik und die heimische Industrie, räumen aber dem ökologischen Wandel und Investitionen in die Infrastruktur Priorität ein. Hierbei ist das Ziel der Stärkung der Mittelschicht bestimmend und staatliche Eingriffe sollen nur dann erfolgen, wenn Märkte versagen. Eine Wiederwahl von Donald Trump hätte eine deutliche Zuspitzung der wirtschafts- und finanzpolitischen Programmatik seiner ersten Amtsperiode zur Folge, mit gravierende Folgen für die EU und Europa. Der angekündigte Importzoll von 10-20 % würde zu Spannungen im Handel führen, da diese unter anderem das Binnenwachstum in Europa untergraben würden. Wenn europäische Exporte durch eine Stärkung des US-Dollars weniger wettbewerbsfähig würden, ist eine weitere Verschärfung der Spannungen zu erwarten. Eine Präsidentin Harris würde die Unternehmenssteuern und die Einkommensteuern für die Oberschicht erhöhen. Trump hingegen drängt darauf, den Unternehmenssteuersatz um einen Prozentpunkt zu senken , und wirbt im Wahlkampf damit, die Steuersenkungen seiner ersten Amtszeit – die umfassendste Änderung der Steuergesetze in 30 Jahren – dauerhaft beizubehalten. Eine Regierung Harris würde die Ausgabenpläne von Biden übernehmen, die über das nächste Jahrzehnt mehrere Billionen US-Dollar in die Wirtschaft pumpen sollen. Trumps Wahlversprechen, Subventionen für Maßnahmen und Technologien für den ökologischen Wandel deutlich zu reduzieren , träfe auch europäische und deutsche Partner, die von den aktuellen Programmen besonders profitieren. Trotz ihrer tiefen politischen und gesellschaftlichen Spaltung bleiben die Vereinigten Staaten ein attraktives Ziel für ausländische Investitionen . Es ist nicht zu erwarten, dass sich die schleichende Aushöhlung demokratischer Normen kurzfristig auf die Investitionsbedingungen auswirkt. Trump hat ein echtes Interesse an der wirtschaftlichen Stärke der USA und könnte von undemokratischen Maßnahmen absehen, wenn sich diese negativ auf das Wirtschaftsumfeld auswirkten. Dennoch bleiben ernsthafte Bedenken mit Blick auf Rechtsstaatlichkeit und Demokratie unter einer Trump-Präsidentschaft. Trotzdem – und ungeachtet seiner Person – unterstützt die US-amerikanische Business Community seine politischen und wirtschaftspolitischen Vorstellungen weitgehend. Handlungsempfehlungen für Unternehmen finden Sie im Report (Download siehe oben)

Agora Strategy Executive Briefing on elections in the UK Executive Summary The Labour Party is set to sweep to power on 4 July with a landslide majority of 150-200+ seats, as the governing Conservatives face unprecedented losses. A Labour government led by Sir Keir Starmer will seek closer relations with the EU and for the UK to remain an active player in international matters, but the scale of domestic and geoeconomic problems severely limit its room for manoeuvre. Labour have promised no major tax rises and only limited policy change, but the country’s poor economic outlook makes keeping up either extremely difficult. Implications for International Business Labour have ruled out increasing income tax, VAT, and national insurance contributions, but have not done so for some others, e.g. on capital gains, second homes, and shares. In fact, they propose £8.6 billion in tax increases, such as a windfall tax of £1.2bn from oil and gas companies and increased taxes for non-domiciled taxpayers. There will be some easing of obstacles to EU-UK trade, but more significant changes, such as the UK rejoining the Single Market, have been ruled out.  State of Play Change is inevitable, but will come slowly After 14 years in power, an exhausted Conservative Party led by Prime Minister Rishi Sunak will suffer a landslide defeat on 4 July. With a record majority, a Labour-led government could be more stable and predictable than its counterparts in France or the United States. Also, markets have anticipated a change of government so no sudden shocks are expected. Yet, Labour will inherit one of the worst economic and fiscal outlooks for any government since 1945. Long-term problems of low investment and productivity have mixed with austerity, Brexit, and Covid to leave Britain with stagnant growth, tight finances, and underfunded and crumbling public services. Voters are angry at the longest waiting lists at the National Health Service (NHS) on record, prisons at breaking point, large swathes of local government on the verge of bankruptcy, a housing and infrastructure crisis, immigration at record highs, and average earnings which, when adjusted for inflation, have barely moved since 2009. The UK’s standard of living is not expected to return to pre-pandemic levels until 2025, making the 2019-2024 parliament the first ever when living standards at the start were higher than those at the end.   Labour have promised change, but stress caution to assure voters that they will not be reckless. The result has been an election manifesto committed to modest tax rises and spending commitments. This is based on an unrealistic hope that growth will come from political stability unlocking investment. While stability of government will be welcomed by the public, businesses, investors, and allies, it will be insufficient to generate the growth and change needed. The independent Institute for Fiscal Studies has calculated that without tax rises or increased borrowing by 2028-29 there will be a £20 billion shortfall in government spending; it bluntly described the unwillingness of both major parties to confront this reality as a ‘conspiracy of silence.’ Caution also defines Labour’s approach to international matters. There will be small but welcome changes to UK-EU relations, but no return to the single market despite the isolation and stagnation wrought by Brexit. In the face of growing geoeconomic competition there will be a greater stress on the UK state as the motor for growth and investment, what Labour have labelled ‘securonomics’. However, initiatives such as GB Energy, a new state-owned energy company that will invest in renewables, and a new £7.3 billion National Wealth Fund will take time to deliver. Key Issues Re-anchoring the UK in the West Within a few days of becoming prime minister, Sir Keir Starmer will meet with other Western leaders at the NATO summit in Washington, DC from 9-11 July. It will be the first opportunity for him to set out an international agenda that David Lammy, who is expected to become Labour’s foreign secretary, defined as ‘progressive realism.’ Much like on domestic matters, it is a policy of gradual change that contains a large degree of continuity and caution. On strategically important matters such as Ukraine, Labour will be as steadfast in its support as the previous government. The party has also committed to raising defence spending to 2.5% of GDP, though without a fixed date. A security review in the first 100 days is expected to stress the need for the UK to respond to the weaponization of economic interdependence. The audit will review relations with China, with Labour stressing the need to ‘compete, challenge and cooperate’. The defence pact with Australia and the US (AUKUS) has moved London closer to America’s approach of challenging Beijing. Likewise, the UK government has encouraged companies to ‘de-risk’ relations with China, although it risks being caught between similar efforts by the USA and EU.   Also in July, Starmer will host around 50 leaders of the European Political Community, the new pan-European group convening all countries of the continent (including Turkey, but not Russia and Belarus). This will allow him to present European partners with more constructive and conciliatory terms than they often received from the Tories. The result will be a widely anticipated UK-EU defence and security pact. At the same time, Labour has been clear that there will be ‘no single market membership, no customs union, and no freedom of movement.’ These red lines, intended to limit accusations that Labour will backtrack on Brexit, will be progressively tested as the new government has to confront some of the UK economy’s underlying problems. Europe has become more, not less important to the UK’s economy since Brexit.   A Labour government’s progressive realism, however, will be limited by the scale of domestic challenges, leaving Starmer little bandwidth to engage on international matters. EU leaders will also have noticed Nigel Farage’s return to UK politics as the leader of the Reform Party, which might merge with – or, rather, usurp – the Tories. That will fuel uncertainty as to whether a change to a Labour government will lead to longer-term changes in UK attitudes to the EU. Finally, the prospect of Donald Trump’s return to the Oval Office has led even Labour to reach out to the Republican Party. Efforts to coordinate transatlantic relations with European partners could be tested by a temptation to maintain the US-UK ‘special relationship’ by stressing the UK’s defence spending and non-membership of the EU, which both appeal to Trump. Britain still lagging on global trade Labour offers few solutions to the drag that Brexit has had on the UK economy, contributing to a decline in business investment and lowering the country’s ‘trade openness’. Goods exports and imports since 2019 have been the weakest in the G7, with exports from high-value manufacturing sectors being especially hard hit, e.g. chemical exports down 15% since 2018. Brexit has disrupted supply chains, increasing costs that hurt small and medium sized businesses more than large companies. While the UK has signed some trade agreements around the world, their effect on trade has been negligible. As a result, the EU’s place as the UK’s most important trading partner has grown. In contrast, the UK has outperformed most other advanced economies in services exports: ‘Other business services’ (e.g. legal services, business consultancy and accounting) are now the UK’s leading export sector, on which Brexit has imposed fewer costs than on the more regulated financial services sector. The EU’s continued importance to UK businesses explains why despite fears that it would proactively diverge from EU regulations, the UK has remained closely aligned. Instead, ‘passive divergence’, where the UK struggles to keep up with the pace of EU legislation, has begun to emerge in areas from product repairability to supply chain due diligence.   Reversing the drag of Brexit on the UK economy will require larger changes than those proposed as part of a review of the UK-EU Trade and Cooperation Agreement in 2026. While a phytosanitary agreement, some mutual recognition of professional qualifications, an agreement on youth mobility, and a defence and security agreement will be welcome, they cannot repair the damage of Brexit or facilitate additional growth of services exports. That will require the UK and EU to discuss access to the single market and customs union, which neither side are keen to explore. As older Eurosceptic voters are replaced by younger pro-European voters, Labour’s electoral room for manoeuvre may change in the long term, but for now, the EU economy and its regulations are advancing, while the UK struggles to play catch-up.

In dem Agora Strategy Geopolitik-Podcast „The Future of Power“ lädt Dr. Timo Blenk (CEO), monatlich Entscheidungsträger aus Diplomatie; Wirtschaft; Politik und Militär ein, um aktuelle geopolitische Entwicklungen zu diskutieren. Über die Einflüsse dieser zu informieren und fundierte Entscheidungsgrundlagen zu schaffen, ist der Kern dieses Projekts. Diesen Monat war Dr. Elli Pohlkamp, Leiterin des Agora Strategy Institutes und Director bei der Agora Strategy Group, zu Gast! In der 25. Folge unseres Podcasts diskutieren Dr. Blenk und Dr. Pohlkamp die Frage "Is Autocracy winning?". Sie beleuchten die geopolitischen Risiken, die Unternehmen im Jahr 2025 im Blick behalten sollten, und warum CEOs ein "geopolitisches Mindset" entwickeln müssen. Die wichtigsten Themen des Monats Big Picture und globale Verschiebungen Big Tech, Elon Musk, Donald Trump Energie & Klimawandel China vs. USA Geopolitische Flashpoints Populismus und weitere Themen   Hausmitteilungen   Alle weiteren Folgen des Podcasts Agora Strategy Webauftritt Agora Strategy bei LinkedIn Aktuelle Projekte & Veranstaltungen des Agora-Strategy-Teams Agora Strategy Risk Report 2025 Agora Strategy Institute Executive Mitgliedschaft Dean's Comment: Dr. Peter Ammon zu Trumps Comeback For English subtitles please find our podcast on youtube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bPMTA2Vmoi8