Agora Strategy Executive Briefing on EU climate industrial policies Executive Summary The geopolitical context with an incoming tariff-wielding US administration and a sluggish-but-combative China as well as domestic politics in member states require the EU to combine decarbonization with competitiveness and security. Within 100 days after assuming office on December 1, the European Commission is expected to present a “Clean Industrial Deal” to harmonize current climate and energy policies with competitiveness, industry and growth objectives. The fragmentation of the single market, high energy prices, the far-right backlash on climate policy, as well as potential tariffs from the US put at risk Europe’s economic model and its current decarbonization path. Implications for International Business Several EU measures and investments will incentivize clean tech industries such as offshore wind, semiconductors, electrolysers, electric vehicles (EVs), and heat pumps, and support other sectors to decarbonize like steel, cement and aluminum. The planned ‘Clean Trade and Investment Partnerships’ to secure supply chains relevant to the green transition, such as for critical raw materials, is likely to include investment opportunities, in particular with producer countries. Given the prospect of increased US tariffs, European firms should prepare for a more politicized, regionalized and protectionist international market environment. Rather than looking for special deals, they should advocate for an EU response that respects rules-based trade to benefit the overall European economy. State of Play From European Green Deal to Clean Industrial Deal Under the umbrella term of the European Green Deal, the EU passed a number of policy initiatives over the past five years to reach its climate target of “net zero” by 2050. These included the Fitfor55 legislative package, a reform of the Emissions Trading System (ETS), and new emission standards for cars. The EU has also ‘greened’ trade through instruments such as the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) and the EU deforestation regulation (EUDR). This approach is here to stay: European climate law is legally binding, and decision-makers at the highest level – including re-elected Commission President Ursula von der Leyen – have vowed to continue the EU’s decarbonization path.   What will change, however, is that EU climate policy will adapt to the geopolitical context and to alleviate current economic woes. Member states governments have little to no appetite for ambitious new initiatives, due to populist pressure, high energy prices driving up the cost of living and decreasing competitiveness, and security issues, especially Russia’s continued war in Ukraine in conjunction with the potential withdrawal of the US security umbrella in Europe. In addition, external climate tools, such as EUDR and CBAM, have been heavily criticized by developing countries for stymying trade with the EU.   Therefore, both the outstanding implementation of existing legislation and any new proposals will focus on making the green transition more compatible with Europe’s global competitiveness and need for “strategic autonomy”. Within the first 100 days, the Commission will present a Competitiveness Compass, to include proposals on boosting innovation to close the gap with the United States, the Clean Industrial Deal, and economic security initiatives, such as international Clean Trade and Investment Partnerships. This package will tackle vulnerabilities in supply chains and rebalance the Green Deal’s initial supply-side tilt. It also aims to deepen the single market and strengthen competitiveness, as suggested in the EU’s most recent reform reports. Key Issues Finance and market prospects of clean industrial policy The Clean Industrial Deal is expected to propose a range of policy initiatives, starting with a reform of carbon pricing and energy market design. It will also promote more electrification through a scheme called Carbon Contracts for Difference, a stronger integration of energy markets, and measures to support the clean tech sector. A single market for CO2 should help to decarbonize basic industry sectors like steel and cement. The Commission is further likely to introduce local production requirements in public procurement contracts to incentivize companies to manufacture in Europe. On the funding side, the Clean Industrial Deal is likely to include a new European Competitiveness Fund to complement existing tools such as the European Investment Fund or Important Projects of Common European Interest.   Two main obstacles stand in the way of such a policy: First, member states tend to protect national industries, such as Berlin wanting to produce green steel in Germany, even though this would be more cost efficient in Southern Spain or Sweden. A temporary abrogation of state aid rules during the Covid-19 pandemic mostly benefitted the bigger member states and has led to a detrimental fragmentation of the single market, which the incoming Commission will seek to rectify. It will also overhaul EU competition policy, which primarily focuses on the single market and does not sufficiently consider unfair competition from outside. Instead, it will have to balance support for strategic sectors – e.g. infrastructure, semiconductors, defence, energy and clean tech sectors – while ensuring fair and healthy competition within the single market. Second, funding will be controversial. The Commission is likely to try to leverage new debt after the successful NextGenerationEU package of 750 bn EUR in 2020, which runs out in 2026. So, national governments have to decide about giving the EU enough fiscal leverage to strategically invest in the European economy. Three elements are to be considered: The upcoming negotiations for the next EU budget (2028-34); increasing the EU’s own resources (despite political standstill over the past two years); and the establishment of the capital markets union in order to raise private capital for the transition. Despite these hurdles, the Competitiveness Compass could prove essential to keep key innovations, technology, industries and jobs in Europe as the continent expects to be ‘squeezed’ by the increasing rivalry between the US and China. Geopolitical issues and implications As China heavily subsidises green-tech industries such as wind, solar panels and EVs, the US started to massively invest in its green transition under the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA). These industrial policies have distorted the global level playing field and created unfair advantages for American and Chinese businesses, to which the Clean Industrial Deal aims to provide a commensurate response. Beyond such strategy, however, both China and the US will be less friendly trading partners. Chinese overcapacity is already flooding markets, while the next US President is expected to impose a randomly chosen tariff on EU-made goods, possibly even on specific member states (in disregard of, but with effects for, the single market). Domestically, he promised to extend the tax credits of his first term and to subsidise fossil fuel companies. While foreign-owned companies, including European ones, had access to the IRA until now, the subsidy splurge per se is protectionist in nature and therefore disadvantageous to the European economy. Firms should also be wary of potential pressures from the US administration on data protection and privacy rules in the EU.   In terms of free trade agreements (FTAs), the EU will try to conclude still open negotiations, most importantly with Mercosur, but also with India, Indonesia, or the Philippines. After successfully adding climate concerns to the draft FTAs, it is now domestic populist instrumentalization that risks blocking EU trade deals in the future – as French and Polish opposition to the EU-Mercosur agreement shows. The new Clean Trade and Investment Partnerships will regroup certain existing instruments, for instance on critical raw materials. However, they are not legally binding and have to chime with the EU’s diplomatic and development tools, especially Global Gateway, to secure long-term access to relevant raw materials and technology and to strengthen supply chains.   Lastly, businesses should prepare for the application of the CBAM and the newly reformed ETS, which will include buildings and road and transport in the coming years. Moreover, a simplification of the rules and cutting of red tape is in the offing, without implying deregulation and less standards. In addition, firms are advised to also follow the national implementation, as governments often add administrative burdens to the initial EU legislation, a practice known as ‘gold-plating’. This was the case for funds within the Common Agricultural Policy and the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive and is likely to happen again with the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive.

Auswirkungen der US-Wahlen auf die europäische Wirtschaft Download des Reports: Zusammenfassung Derzeit ist der Ausgang der Präsidentschaftswahl in den USA am 5. November noch völlig offen. Die Nominierung von Vizepräsidentin Kamala Harris als Kandidatin der Demokratischen Partei hat den Wahlkampf neu belebt. Harris und ihr Gegenkandidat, der frühere Präsident Donald Trump, liegen in landesweiten Umfragen ebenso wie in den wichtigen Swing States weitgehend gleichauf und haben somit beide eine realistische Chance auf den Wahlsieg. Die Republikaner haben in den Umfragen für die Kongresswahlen weiterhin einen kleinen Vorsprung in beiden Kammern und werden das Repräsentantenhaus voraussichtlich mit knappem Vorsprung halten. Allerdings erhöhen Harris‘ Kandidatur sowie ein wachsender Trend zum Stimmensplitting die Chancen der demokratischen Kandidaten und könnten in einem engen Rennen für Überraschungen sorgen. Ungeachtet des Wahlergebnisses wird sich die nächste US-Administration noch intensiver auf innenpolitische Herausforderungen konzentrieren. Dabei stehen insbesondere die weitere Stärkung der heimischen Industrie , die Reduzierung von Abhängigkeiten von China und eine kritische Haltung gegenüber Freihandel und Globalisierung im Fokus. Die Wahl von Trump würde die Wiederaufnahme von politischen Maßnahmen und Zielen aus seiner ersten Amtszeit bedeuten: niedrigere Steuern, weniger Regulierung, Förderung der Industrieproduktion, Zurückdrehen der Klimapolitik , stärkere Unterstützung von Erdöl- und Erdgasgewinnung in den USA und ein eher transaktionales und merkantilistisches Konzept für Handel und Sicherheit, u. a. im Hinblick auf den Umgang mit Bündnispartnern. Mit dem Slogan einer „Opportunity Economy“ konzentrieren sich die wirtschaftlichen Vorschläge von Harris zwar auch auf die Innenpolitik und die heimische Industrie, räumen aber dem ökologischen Wandel und Investitionen in die Infrastruktur Priorität ein. Hierbei ist das Ziel der Stärkung der Mittelschicht bestimmend und staatliche Eingriffe sollen nur dann erfolgen, wenn Märkte versagen. Eine Wiederwahl von Donald Trump hätte eine deutliche Zuspitzung der wirtschafts- und finanzpolitischen Programmatik seiner ersten Amtsperiode zur Folge, mit gravierende Folgen für die EU und Europa. Der angekündigte Importzoll von 10-20 % würde zu Spannungen im Handel führen, da diese unter anderem das Binnenwachstum in Europa untergraben würden. Wenn europäische Exporte durch eine Stärkung des US-Dollars weniger wettbewerbsfähig würden, ist eine weitere Verschärfung der Spannungen zu erwarten. Eine Präsidentin Harris würde die Unternehmenssteuern und die Einkommensteuern für die Oberschicht erhöhen. Trump hingegen drängt darauf, den Unternehmenssteuersatz um einen Prozentpunkt zu senken , und wirbt im Wahlkampf damit, die Steuersenkungen seiner ersten Amtszeit – die umfassendste Änderung der Steuergesetze in 30 Jahren – dauerhaft beizubehalten. Eine Regierung Harris würde die Ausgabenpläne von Biden übernehmen, die über das nächste Jahrzehnt mehrere Billionen US-Dollar in die Wirtschaft pumpen sollen. Trumps Wahlversprechen, Subventionen für Maßnahmen und Technologien für den ökologischen Wandel deutlich zu reduzieren , träfe auch europäische und deutsche Partner, die von den aktuellen Programmen besonders profitieren. Trotz ihrer tiefen politischen und gesellschaftlichen Spaltung bleiben die Vereinigten Staaten ein attraktives Ziel für ausländische Investitionen . Es ist nicht zu erwarten, dass sich die schleichende Aushöhlung demokratischer Normen kurzfristig auf die Investitionsbedingungen auswirkt. Trump hat ein echtes Interesse an der wirtschaftlichen Stärke der USA und könnte von undemokratischen Maßnahmen absehen, wenn sich diese negativ auf das Wirtschaftsumfeld auswirkten. Dennoch bleiben ernsthafte Bedenken mit Blick auf Rechtsstaatlichkeit und Demokratie unter einer Trump-Präsidentschaft. Trotzdem – und ungeachtet seiner Person – unterstützt die US-amerikanische Business Community seine politischen und wirtschaftspolitischen Vorstellungen weitgehend. Handlungsempfehlungen für Unternehmen finden Sie im Report (Download siehe oben)

Agora Strategy Executive Briefing on elections in the UK Executive Summary The Labour Party is set to sweep to power on 4 July with a landslide majority of 150-200+ seats, as the governing Conservatives face unprecedented losses. A Labour government led by Sir Keir Starmer will seek closer relations with the EU and for the UK to remain an active player in international matters, but the scale of domestic and geoeconomic problems severely limit its room for manoeuvre. Labour have promised no major tax rises and only limited policy change, but the country’s poor economic outlook makes keeping up either extremely difficult. Implications for International Business Labour have ruled out increasing income tax, VAT, and national insurance contributions, but have not done so for some others, e.g. on capital gains, second homes, and shares. In fact, they propose £8.6 billion in tax increases, such as a windfall tax of £1.2bn from oil and gas companies and increased taxes for non-domiciled taxpayers. There will be some easing of obstacles to EU-UK trade, but more significant changes, such as the UK rejoining the Single Market, have been ruled out.  State of Play Change is inevitable, but will come slowly After 14 years in power, an exhausted Conservative Party led by Prime Minister Rishi Sunak will suffer a landslide defeat on 4 July. With a record majority, a Labour-led government could be more stable and predictable than its counterparts in France or the United States. Also, markets have anticipated a change of government so no sudden shocks are expected. Yet, Labour will inherit one of the worst economic and fiscal outlooks for any government since 1945. Long-term problems of low investment and productivity have mixed with austerity, Brexit, and Covid to leave Britain with stagnant growth, tight finances, and underfunded and crumbling public services. Voters are angry at the longest waiting lists at the National Health Service (NHS) on record, prisons at breaking point, large swathes of local government on the verge of bankruptcy, a housing and infrastructure crisis, immigration at record highs, and average earnings which, when adjusted for inflation, have barely moved since 2009. The UK’s standard of living is not expected to return to pre-pandemic levels until 2025, making the 2019-2024 parliament the first ever when living standards at the start were higher than those at the end.   Labour have promised change, but stress caution to assure voters that they will not be reckless. The result has been an election manifesto committed to modest tax rises and spending commitments. This is based on an unrealistic hope that growth will come from political stability unlocking investment. While stability of government will be welcomed by the public, businesses, investors, and allies, it will be insufficient to generate the growth and change needed. The independent Institute for Fiscal Studies has calculated that without tax rises or increased borrowing by 2028-29 there will be a £20 billion shortfall in government spending; it bluntly described the unwillingness of both major parties to confront this reality as a ‘conspiracy of silence.’ Caution also defines Labour’s approach to international matters. There will be small but welcome changes to UK-EU relations, but no return to the single market despite the isolation and stagnation wrought by Brexit. In the face of growing geoeconomic competition there will be a greater stress on the UK state as the motor for growth and investment, what Labour have labelled ‘securonomics’. However, initiatives such as GB Energy, a new state-owned energy company that will invest in renewables, and a new £7.3 billion National Wealth Fund will take time to deliver. Key Issues Re-anchoring the UK in the West Within a few days of becoming prime minister, Sir Keir Starmer will meet with other Western leaders at the NATO summit in Washington, DC from 9-11 July. It will be the first opportunity for him to set out an international agenda that David Lammy, who is expected to become Labour’s foreign secretary, defined as ‘progressive realism.’ Much like on domestic matters, it is a policy of gradual change that contains a large degree of continuity and caution. On strategically important matters such as Ukraine, Labour will be as steadfast in its support as the previous government. The party has also committed to raising defence spending to 2.5% of GDP, though without a fixed date. A security review in the first 100 days is expected to stress the need for the UK to respond to the weaponization of economic interdependence. The audit will review relations with China, with Labour stressing the need to ‘compete, challenge and cooperate’. The defence pact with Australia and the US (AUKUS) has moved London closer to America’s approach of challenging Beijing. Likewise, the UK government has encouraged companies to ‘de-risk’ relations with China, although it risks being caught between similar efforts by the USA and EU.   Also in July, Starmer will host around 50 leaders of the European Political Community, the new pan-European group convening all countries of the continent (including Turkey, but not Russia and Belarus). This will allow him to present European partners with more constructive and conciliatory terms than they often received from the Tories. The result will be a widely anticipated UK-EU defence and security pact. At the same time, Labour has been clear that there will be ‘no single market membership, no customs union, and no freedom of movement.’ These red lines, intended to limit accusations that Labour will backtrack on Brexit, will be progressively tested as the new government has to confront some of the UK economy’s underlying problems. Europe has become more, not less important to the UK’s economy since Brexit.   A Labour government’s progressive realism, however, will be limited by the scale of domestic challenges, leaving Starmer little bandwidth to engage on international matters. EU leaders will also have noticed Nigel Farage’s return to UK politics as the leader of the Reform Party, which might merge with – or, rather, usurp – the Tories. That will fuel uncertainty as to whether a change to a Labour government will lead to longer-term changes in UK attitudes to the EU. Finally, the prospect of Donald Trump’s return to the Oval Office has led even Labour to reach out to the Republican Party. Efforts to coordinate transatlantic relations with European partners could be tested by a temptation to maintain the US-UK ‘special relationship’ by stressing the UK’s defence spending and non-membership of the EU, which both appeal to Trump. Britain still lagging on global trade Labour offers few solutions to the drag that Brexit has had on the UK economy, contributing to a decline in business investment and lowering the country’s ‘trade openness’. Goods exports and imports since 2019 have been the weakest in the G7, with exports from high-value manufacturing sectors being especially hard hit, e.g. chemical exports down 15% since 2018. Brexit has disrupted supply chains, increasing costs that hurt small and medium sized businesses more than large companies. While the UK has signed some trade agreements around the world, their effect on trade has been negligible. As a result, the EU’s place as the UK’s most important trading partner has grown. In contrast, the UK has outperformed most other advanced economies in services exports: ‘Other business services’ (e.g. legal services, business consultancy and accounting) are now the UK’s leading export sector, on which Brexit has imposed fewer costs than on the more regulated financial services sector. The EU’s continued importance to UK businesses explains why despite fears that it would proactively diverge from EU regulations, the UK has remained closely aligned. Instead, ‘passive divergence’, where the UK struggles to keep up with the pace of EU legislation, has begun to emerge in areas from product repairability to supply chain due diligence.   Reversing the drag of Brexit on the UK economy will require larger changes than those proposed as part of a review of the UK-EU Trade and Cooperation Agreement in 2026. While a phytosanitary agreement, some mutual recognition of professional qualifications, an agreement on youth mobility, and a defence and security agreement will be welcome, they cannot repair the damage of Brexit or facilitate additional growth of services exports. That will require the UK and EU to discuss access to the single market and customs union, which neither side are keen to explore. As older Eurosceptic voters are replaced by younger pro-European voters, Labour’s electoral room for manoeuvre may change in the long term, but for now, the EU economy and its regulations are advancing, while the UK struggles to play catch-up.

In dem Agora Strategy Geopolitik-Podcast „The Future of Power“ lädt Dr. Timo Blenk (CEO), monatlich Entscheidungsträger aus Diplomatie; Wirtschaft; Politik und Militär ein, um aktuelle geopolitische Entwicklungen zu diskutieren. Über die Einflüsse dieser zu informieren und fundierte Entscheidungsgrundlagen zu schaffen, ist der Kern dieses Projekts. Diesen Monat war Dr. Elli Pohlkamp, Leiterin des Agora Strategy Institutes und Director bei der Agora Strategy Group, zu Gast! In der 25. Folge unseres Podcasts diskutieren Dr. Blenk und Dr. Pohlkamp die Frage "Is Autocracy winning?". Sie beleuchten die geopolitischen Risiken, die Unternehmen im Jahr 2025 im Blick behalten sollten, und warum CEOs ein "geopolitisches Mindset" entwickeln müssen. Die wichtigsten Themen des Monats Big Picture und globale Verschiebungen Big Tech, Elon Musk, Donald Trump Energie & Klimawandel China vs. USA Geopolitische Flashpoints Populismus und weitere Themen   Hausmitteilungen   Alle weiteren Folgen des Podcasts Agora Strategy Webauftritt Agora Strategy bei LinkedIn Aktuelle Projekte & Veranstaltungen des Agora-Strategy-Teams Agora Strategy Risk Report 2025 Agora Strategy Institute Executive Mitgliedschaft Dean's Comment: Dr. Peter Ammon zu Trumps Comeback For English subtitles please find our podcast on youtube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bPMTA2Vmoi8

In dieser Folge spricht Roberta Randerath von Agora Strategy mit der Expertin für Weltraumsicherheitspolitik Andrea Rotter von der Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung über die strategische Bedeutung des Weltraums im Kontext geopolitischer Rivalität.

Was haben Geopolitik und Finanzstrategien gemeinsam? Mehr, als man denkt, sagt unser neuer Senior Partner Prof. Dr. Kai Andrejewski im Gespräch mit Dr. Timo Blenk. Was hat dich dazu bewogen, die Branche (von SIXT SE zu Agora Strategy) zu wechseln? In meiner Rolle als CFO der SIXT SE war eine meiner wesentlichen Verantwortlichkeiten die Entwicklung der Equity- und Debtstory der Gesellschaft – also der Kapitalmarktstory. Dabei ergaben sich immer wieder Schnittstellen, die mir klarmachten, dass eine fundierte geopolitische Analyse die Grundvoraussetzung hierfür ist. Daher war der Wechsel zu Agora Strategy eine inhaltliche Weiterentwicklung. Des Weiteren bin ich persönlich davon überzeugt, dass es sehr viel Freude macht, beruflich neue Perspektiven zu entwickeln. SIXT ist ein sehr innovatives Unternehmen, es hat sich also gar nicht so viel geändert. Welche geopolitischen Faktoren beeinflussen deiner Erfahrung nach die Finanzstrategien internationaler Unternehmen? Die Kapitalmarktstrategie eines Unternehmens muss die geopolitischen Rahmenbedingungen berücksichtigen. Dies fängt bei unterschiedlicher Regulatorik in den USA und in Europa an. Viel entscheidender ist aber, dass jede finanzpolitische Entscheidung geopolitische Implikationen hat. Kann ein Börsengang in den USA beispielsweise mit einer chinesisch geprägten Lieferkette einhergehen? Welche Rolle spielt Geopolitik in Investitionsentscheidungen heutzutage? Hier gibt es zum einen umfangreiche regulatorische Interdependenzen. Aber für europäische Unternehmen ist der Fokus breiter. Gewinnmaximierung muss mit den restriktiven europäischen Regeln in Einklang gebracht werden. Darüber hinaus sind aber auch geopolitische Risiken und Chancen mit einzubeziehen. So kann beispielsweise ein differenziertes Tax- und Zollregime in den USA auch Arbitragemöglichkeiten bieten. Wie entwickelt man resiliente Finanzstrategien in unsicheren Zeiten? Das „kleine Einmaleins“ hinsichtlich Liquidität und Performance bleibt grundsätzlich unberührt. Allerdings müssen global agierende europäische Unternehmen berücksichtigen, dass der Kapitalmarkt nicht vorbehaltlos global ist. Daher sollten sie sowohl auf der Debt- als auch auf der Equity-Seite auf Internationalisierung setzen. Das fängt bei einer differenzierten Bankenlandschaft an und geht bis zu Standort- und Taxoptimierung. Welcher geopolitische Trend hat aktuell den größten Einfluss auf globale Märkte? Die Veränderung von einer globalen regelbasierten Ordnung zu einem multipolaren Umfeld macht gerade vor den globalen Märkten, aber besonders vor den Finanzmärkten nicht halt. Interessant werden hier die Rückkoppelungen sein, die noch nicht so sehr im Fokus stehen. Inwieweit können amerikanische Investoren weiterhin in europäische Unternehmen investieren, die Nachhaltigkeitsziele vor Profitabilitätsziele stellen? Und wie werden sich europäische Unternehmen im Vergleich zu amerikanischen Unternehmen behaupten können, wenn die Deregulierung in den USA deutlich schneller voranschreitet?

In dem Agora Strategy Geopolitik-Podcast „The Future of Power“ lädt Dr. Timo Blenk (CEO), monatlich Entscheidungsträger aus Diplomatie; Wirtschaft; Politik und Militär ein, um aktuelle geopolitische Entwicklungen zu diskutieren. Über die Einflüsse dieser zu informieren und fundierte Entscheidungsgrundlagen zu schaffen, ist der Kern dieses Projekts. Diesen Monat war Herr Stefan Kornelius, Leiter des Politk-Ressort der Süddeutsche Zeitung, zu Gast! In der 24ten Folge unseres Podcasts sprechen Dr. Blenk und Herr Kornelius über die Hintergründe der aktuellen Schlagzeilen! Die wichtigsten Themen des Monats USA – Großmacht ohne Richtung?: Selbstverleugnung, transaktionale Politik und die Erschöpfung des Liberalismus. Die Zukunft der EU: Zwischen Bürokratie-Kritik, der Herausforderung im Osten und darüber hinaus und einem bröckelnden Versprechen. Medien im Umbruch: News-Fatigue, Atomisierung und die Rolle von KI – wie sich der Journalismus verändert. Deutschland 2025: Zwischen Personal- & Koalitionsfragen.   Hausmitteilungen   Alle weiteren Folgen des Podcasts Agora Strategy Webauftritt Agora Strategy bei LinkedIn Aktuelle Projekte & Veranstaltungen des Agora-Strategy-Teams Agora Strategy Institute Executive Mitgliedschaft Dean's Comment: Dr. Peter Ammon zu Trumps Comeback Neue Publikation von Dr. Elli Pohlkamp - Südkorea & Japan For English subtitles please find our podcast on youtube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HNYbun-ORPY

In dem Agora Strategy Group Geopolitik-Podcast „The Future of Power“ lädt Dr. Timo Blenk (CEO), monatlich Entscheidungsträger aus Diplomatie; Wirtschaft; Politik und Militär ein, um aktuelle geopolitische Entwicklungen zu diskutieren. Über die Einflüsse dieser zu informieren und fundierte Entscheidungsgrundlagen zu schaffen, ist der Kern dieses Projekts.   In dieser 23. Folge greifen Dr. Timo Blenk und Prof. Dr. Kai Andrejewski, beide Senior Partner bei der Agora Strategy Group, Ihre Fragen auf, analysieren aktuelle Entwicklungen und diskutieren praxisnahe Maßnahmen, die Unternehmen jetzt ergreifen sollten. Moderiert wurde die Folge von Christina Schäfer, Consultant bei der Agora Strategy Group.   Die wichtigsten Themen des Monats (siehe Beschreibung) Von A wie Autoindustrie bis Z wie Zusammenhalt in Europa: Rundumschlag Geopolitik & Unternehmen Das transatlantische Verhältnis im Wandel: Trump 2.0 - Herausforderungen & Chancen Europäische Prioritäten: Verteidigung & gemeinsame Prioritären  Im Blick behalten: Indien, Satellitentechnik, Wasser, Demografie & Finanzkrisen   Hausmitteilungen   Alle weiteren Folgen des Podcasts „Agora Strategy Group“ Webauftritt „Agora Strategy Group“ bei LinkedIn Aktuelle Projekte & Veranstaltungen des Agora-Strategy-Teams Agora Strategy Institute Executive Mitgliedschaft Dean's Comment: Dr. Peter Ammon zu Trumps Comeback Neue Publikation von Dr. Elli Pohlkamp - Südkorea & Japan

Dr. Elli-Katharina Pohlkamp ist Director bei der Agora Strategy Group und Leiterin des Agora Strategy Institutes. Ebenfalls ist sie als Visiting Fellow des Asienprogramms beim European Council on Foreign Relations tätig. Zuvor arbeitete sie als Japan-Analystin in München, als Policy Fellow beim Progressiven Zentrum Berlin, als Forschungsassistentin und Forum Ebenhausen-Stipendiatin an der Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP Berlin) sowie als Projektreferentin in der Abteilung Europa und Internationale Angelegenheiten der Hessischen Staatskanzlei in Wiesbaden. Sie hat an der Universität Tübingen promoviert und war als Doktorandin am Deutschen Institut für Japanstudien in Tokio tätig. Ihre Fachgebiete sind Japans Außen-, Wirtschafts- und Sicherheitspolitik, EU-Japan, Japan-Korea und China-Japan Beziehungen, sowie Geostrategien im Indopazifik. Expertise Politik und Wirtschaft Ostasiens, Japanische Außenbeziehungen, Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik, Strategien im indo-pazifischen Raum, Beziehungen zwischen der EU, Deutschland und Japan, China-Japan Beziehungen. Auswahl an Publikationen und Podcasts What Europe can learn from Japan’s approach to the global south The new central front: Japan’s special role in the West’s strategic rivalry with China Agora Strategy Podcast The Future of Power - Die Rolle Japans als geopolitischer Akteur The weight of history: Why the recent thaw in South Korea-Japan relations may not last Setting the course: Japan's new security strategy

Dr. Cornelius Adebahr ist Senior Fellow und Editor des Agora Strategy Institutes. Er arbeitet darüber hinaus als unabhängiger politischer Analyst und Berater in Berlin und Rom. Seine Expertise umfasst außen- und sicherheitspolitische Fragen, insbesondere zu Iran und dem Persischen Golf, sowie die europäische und transatlantische Zusammenarbeit.Zu seinen Kunden zählen politische Institutionen, Unternehmen und zivilgesellschaftliche Organisationen sowie internationale Think Tanks.   Adebahr ist Lehrbeauftragter an der Hertie School in Berlin. Zuvor lehrte er an der Georgetown University in Washington, DC, der Willy Brandt School of Public Policy in Erfurt und der Universität Teheran in Iran. Er veröffentlicht häufig in, und wird zitiert von, internationalen Medien wie der New York Times, der Washington Post, POLITICO, BBC, CNN, Euronews und Al Jazeera. Expertise Geopolitische Herausforderungen, Strategische Vorausschau, Europäische Union und USA, Iran und Nahost Auswahl an Publikationen und Podcasts Agora Strategy Podcast The Future of Power - Schattenspiele im Nahen Osten – Der Iran und seine geopolitische Agenda If this is Israel’s 9/11, it must not make same mistakes the US did Why AI will Change the Core of Foreign Policymaking Wofür lohnt es sich zu kämpfen? Why water scarcity in Iran is a source of domestic and regional instability. Trump’s ‘virtual reality’ foreign policy Towards a New Balkans Diplomacy The Rewriting of Global Rules, as Seen from India

Executive Summary In the context of growing turbulence around the world, Latin America stands out as a region of low geopolitical risk, where most governments, including Brazil and Mexico, pursue a “multi-aligned strategy” that does not take sides. This helps to attract investors keen to diversify their portfolios and increase their resilience. Brazil positions itself as a key player in the global energy transition, both as a source of critical minerals and a destination of “greenshoring” investments. However, it is also massively ramping up oil production as is set to become the world’s sixth largest producer by 2030. Mexico gained from its long-standing open trade policy and solid manufacturing base, with the potential to hugely benefit from US nearshoring. It also made progress on reducing inequality, but faces major uncertainties from the US election, the risk of democratic backsliding, and continued domestic insecurity. Implications for International Business European firms have the opportunity to capitalize on both Brazil’s and Mexico’s push to diversify both their economies to retain strategic flexibility amidst the risk of a renewed trade war between the United States and China. Brazil and Mexico are promising business hubs, especially in trade, manufacturing, and renewable energy, though a fragile security situation is unlikely to be resolved. The ratification of the EU-Mercosur trade deal, increasingly likely by the end of 2024, would create the world’s largest free trade area of 780 million people and facilitate European investments in Brazil. State of Play Great power competition and global supply chains shape business opportunities in Latin America Latin American countries have more relevant economic ties outside the region than within, each engaging with China and the United States on their own terms. As Washington becomes less open and lacks a clear strategy vis-à-vis its southern neighbors, Beijing is advancing, creating new economic dependencies but without crowding out others. European trade and investment is largely seen as less politically fraught, while more unequal trade with China tends to elicit greater fears about deindustrialization.   Nearshoring and shifts in global supply chains are set to produce expansion and a competitive environment in Latin America across sectors such as manufacturing, electronics, automotive, renewable energy, and resource extraction, especially of critical raw materials. The US Inflation Reduction Act is a source of competition for investments in green energy and electric vehicles, particularly in Mexico and in mineral-rich countries. There is nonetheless an open path for European companies for greater engagement in the region, given stable and trusted EU-Latin America relationships, the region’s needs of diversification, and the new opportunity provided by the hoped-for conclusion of the EU-Mercosur free trade agreement this year. Key Issues Brazil: Multipolarity does not mean diversification Brazil maintains balanced foreign and trade relations while it seeks to benefit from a more diverse world economy, aiming to become an influential voice in the Global South. While its BRICS membership serves to advance a multipolar order which includes initiatives to seek alternatives to the dollar when trading with countries like China, it also cooperates with OECD countries on numerous fronts and has recently decided not to join China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Within the BRICS grouping, Brazil is, alongside India, the moderating force that opposes the more explicitly anti-Western faction led by Russia, China and Iran.    The Brazilian economy benefits from shifting global supply chains, particularly in the manufacturing and logistics sectors. The government under President Lula actively seeks foreign investment in infrastructure, among others through the New Growth Acceleration Program. It has also pushed through a historic tax reform, though concerns about fiscal sustainability remain. As Brazil strives to lead on environmental sustainability, Europe is an important partner for technology investments and export diversification.   Amid global concerns about food security, Brazil’s agricultural sector is expected to grow, providing opportunities for sustainable agriculture and agri-tech innovations. Already well-positioned in the Chinese market, there will be more diversification efforts to reduce overreliance on China’s demand for agricultural commodities. Total investments from the United States and EU countries, respectively, are larger than Chinese investments in Brazil, but increasing trade dependence on China explain a willingness to diversify and reduce strategic vulnerabilities. ESG initiatives can find opportunities in Brazil given its renewable energy sector and its global relevance in environmental sustainability. In tech, the country provides an increasing start-up network to be harnessed by foreign firms. Organized crime remains a continuous challenge and threatens to permeate political institutions, though murder rates have recently fallen. Mexico: Externally driven growth, democratic backsliding and uncertainty over US policy Amid high domestic insecurity, President Claudia Sheinbaum won a landslide victory promising to continue the previous government’s populist leftist policies. However, many of these – including unfunded social spending, weak human rights protection and the introduction of popular elections for justices – have been roundly criticized by the opposition and investors. Hailed by Scheinbaum as the possibility to build “the true rule of law”, the reforms may pose a risk to the independence of the judiciary and produce legal uncertainty for investors. A politicized judiciary that is vulnerable to criminal groups will make businesses more reliant on personal relations with the government and imply lower prospects of a fair trial, if required. The result of the first cycle of election for the Judiciary in mid-2025 may affect domestic and foreign investments, as will any other measures reflecting or deepening the executive’s uncontested power.   Still, the new government can be expected to be pragmatic, with a strong focus on bolstering Mexico’s role within the North American business sphere. This approach will be put to the test if Donald Trump returns to the White House. The softest baseline scenario includes strict national security measures permeating US economic policy, but more likely is a harsh protectionist approach including steep tariffs. At the same time, the USMCA trade agreement acts as an important constraint on Mexico building out its trade and relationships with China. This could be an incentive for the next US president to renew, possibly with some changes, the trilateral trade deal when it is up for review in 2026. While outgoing president Lopez Obrador doubled down on fossil fuels, Sheinbaum, a climate scientist, can be expected to boost investment in renewable energies and emphasize decarbonization.   As Mexico’s second-largest trading partner with an annual bilateral volume of around US$100 billion, China has an important presence as a supplier in electronics, automotive, and consumer goods. Nevertheless, Mexico offers a diversification destination for European companies, while the latter can help the country reduce its reliance on Chinese imports or investments. Shifting supply chains away from China has the potential to drive Mexico’s growth as a nearshoring hub for trade, manufacturing, and technology, with e-commerce and innovations in cross-border logistics on the rise. Prominent sectors for European firms are the automotive, electronics and aerospace, which benefit from these trends as well as cost-effective operations to serve not just the Mexican but also the US market.

Fabian Vetter ist Partner und Chief Operating Officer bei der Agora Strategy Group und in dieser Funktion verantwortlich für die operative Steuerung des Unternehmens. Darüber hinaus betreut er weiterhin größere Projekte mit Schwerpunkt auf internationale Industrieunternehmen sowie Regierungsmandate. Als einer der ersten Mitarbeiter nach Gründung des Unternehmens im Jahr 2015 hat Fabian Vetter die Entwicklung des Unternehmens maßgeblich mitgestaltet. Zuvor war er unter anderem in der politischen Abteilung der BMW Group in München tätig. Fabian Vetter erwarb akademische Abschlüsse in Politik, Politische Ökonomie sowie Geschichtswissenschaft an den Universitäten Heidelberg, Wien und Oslo. Fachgebiete sind neben dem allgemeinen Fokus auf Industrieunternehmen insbesondere Strategie- und Transformationsprozesse im Kontext des tiefgreifenden geopolitischen Wandels sowie außen- und sicherheitspolitische Entwicklungen in Osteuropa und der MENA-Region. Expertise Operations, Unternehmensstrategie, Industrietransformation, Geopolitik in Mittel-/Osteuropa, MENA-Region