In dem Agora Strategy Group Geopolitik-Podcast „The Future of Power“, lädt Dr. Timo Blenk (CEO) monatlich Entscheidungsträger aus Diplomatie, Wirtschaft, Politik und Militär ein, um aktuelle geopolitische Entwicklungen zu diskutieren. Über die Einflüsse dieser zu informieren und fundierte Entscheidungsgrundlagen zu schaffen, ist der Kern dieses Projekts.   Diesen Monat zu Gast ist Prof. Dr. Rafaela Kraus, Professorin für Unternehmens- und Personalführung an der Universität der Bundeswehr in München und Expertin für Innovation und Start-up-Ökosysteme! In der 31ten Folge unseres Podcasts sprechen Dr. Blenk und Prof. Dr. Kraus über die Zukunft der Bundeswehr und den Verteidigungsindustriestandort Deutschland!    Sie finden unseren Podcast mit Untertiteln auch auf Youtube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lEEC1JVV5cA Die wichtigsten Themen des Monats Stichwort Innovation: Organisationskultur, Start-ups und das Ökosystem Bundeswehr   Europäische Abhängigkeit: Space, Digitalisierung und das ‚Mindset Geopolitik‘ Baustelle Bundeswehr: FCAS, die Personalfrage und fehlende Professuren     Hausmitteilungen   Alle weiteren Folgen des Podcasts Agora Strategy Webauftritt Agora Strategy bei LinkedIn Aktuelle Projekte & Veranstaltungen des Agora-Strategy-Teams Agora Strategy Institute Executive Mitgliedschaft Agora Strategy Executive Briefing: Japan Facing Political Instability, U.S. Tariffs, and Regional Insecurity Agora Strategy Executive Briefing: China's Evolving Economic Arsenal: From Fragmented Retaliation to Structured Coercion  Dean's Comment: Merz Meets Trump: The Art of Expectation Management

Agora Strategy Executive Briefing on Santions in China Executive Summary China’s toolbox for economic coercion has become more sophisticated, targeted, and institutionalized. Regulatory investigations, export controls, trade restrictions and legal designations are part of a growing menu of tools replacing earlier unstructured instruments like consumer boycotts. China’s sanctions regime is increasingly formalized yet remains unpredictable in its concrete application. The U.S.-China trade war has served as a successful training ground for this expanded toolkit. Recent restrictions on rare earth elements and magnets have demonstrated Beijing’s ability to exert pressure through strategic dependencies. This appears to have made an impression on the Trump administration and potentially caused the compromise reached in Geneva in early May. European firms are indirect targets – and potential future focal points. Although China has so far exercised restraint and continued what some interpreted as a ‘charm offensive’, European companies in key sectors have already faced disruptions in raw material supply. In the future, China may feel emboldened to use its economic weaponry more actively for its own advantage. Implications for International Business Reinforce supply chain resilience for critical inputs. For firms reliant on rare earths and other critical raw materials, China’s export control system is more than a bureaucratic hurdle. Given the risk of sudden supply disruptions triggered by geopolitical tensions or regulatory delays, they should invest in diversification and dual sourcing strategies to reduce the effect of potential shocks. Manage regulatory exposure and intellectual property risks.  China’s export license procedures include demands for sensitive commercial information, such as operations, workforce, end-use applications, production details, and customer lists. While many businesses appear willing to comply, doing so entails longer-term risks of handing over strategic sensitive data. Integrate scenario planning into corporate planning cycles. Companies that proactively align international strategies with the evolving landscape of strategic competition – especially those with dual exposure to U.S. and Chinese policy risks – enhance their ability to anticipate and adapt to future disruptions. China's sanctions weapons China’s use of economic sanctions is evolving fast , and the implications for European governments and businesses are far-reaching. Until recently, a key concern for foreign firms operating in China was the risk of state-encouraged consumer boycotts. In 2019 and 2020, companies were repeatedly attacked for listing Taiwan or Hong Kong as separate countries on websites and merchandise, for raising concerns about forced labor in Xinjiang, or for ending sourcing from that region. These campaigns were openly encouraged by the Communist Youth League.   In recent years, however, such public consumer boycotts have become less common. This may reflect growing caution among firms about provoking Beijing, but it may also reflect the fact that Chinese authorities increasingly rely on new tools. Today, firms whose home governments cross political red lines are far more likely to be penalized through regulatory and legal measures that are part of a broader system developed after the first U.S.–China trade war in 2018. This system is still taking shape and offers little of the legal certainty that multinational firms might hope for.   Chinese authorities now select from a growing menu of legal and quasi-legal instruments. Long-favored methods involve import restrictions by delaying customs clearance or quietly instructing firms to stop sourcing from targeted countries. In 2020, after Australia called for an independent investigation into the origins of COVID-19, China curbed a broad range of Australian exports, including nearly all wine shipments. When Lithuania permitted the opening of a “Taiwanese Representative Office” in Vilnius in 2021, it was erased from China’s customs database, effectively making it impossible for Lithuanian goods to enter Chinese ports. Other restrictions have come under the guise of trade defense tools. In early 2024, after France had pushed for EU tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles, Beijing launched an anti-dumping investigation into imports of brandy from the EU — a predominantly French product.   Another favored tactic has been to directly target foreign firms operating in China .  After South Korea agreed to deploy a U.S. missile defense system (THAAD) in 2016, Beijing forced dozens of Lotte stores — the South Korean retail giant — to shut down, citing fire safety and other regulatory violations. In recent years, such actions have increasingly been channeled through domestic instruments such as antitrust law. This approach, too, remains in use. U.S. firms like Google, DuPont, and Nvidia have all come under scrutiny in recent months as part of the rivalry with Washington. Even when probes do not result in formal penalties, the uncertainty it generates has real commercial consequences — by making business operations harder, depressing investor confidence, and exposing companies to reputational risks in China’s market.   What marks a clear shift is China’s construction of a legal sanctions framework that allows it to target foreign firms and individuals with greater coherence and precision. Three instruments stand out: First, the Unreliable Entity List, launched in September 2020. It allows Chinese authorities to impose punitive measures on foreign entities deemed to harm China’s national sovereignty, security, or development interests. In practice, it has been used mainly against U.S. defense contractors involved in military cooperation with Taiwan. In 2025, however, it was also applied to clothing group PVH and biotech firm Illumina in retaliation for U.S. tariffs.   While officially accused of violating market principles, Illumina is widely believed to have been targeted for lobbying in support of the Biosecure Act — a proposed U.S. law aimed at restricting Chinese access to American genetic data and biotech infrastructure. This law signals a shift toward techno-nationalism, potentially accelerating the decoupling of Western and Chinese biotech supply chains and prompting allies to adopt similar screening mechanisms. This would have severe implications for the global pharma industry as it restricts access to Chinese-made biotech components, compels firms to reassess vendor relationships, and increases compliance costs.   Second, the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law, adopted in June 2021 and updated in 2024 has also primarily been used to limit the activities of U.S. defense firms. In addition, it has been invoked to sanction researchers and officials accused of interfering in China’s internal affairs. Third, the Export Control Law, in force since December 2020 provides the legal basis for restricting exports of dual-use, military, and other sensitive goods. It authorizes reciprocal measures against countries imposing export controls on China and enables targeted restrictions through an export control list. So far, this list has similarly been used against US defense companies in particular. While China has shown a growing willingness to impose costs on foreign firms, much of this remains largely symbolic. Many of the targeted U.S. defense companies have limited or no commercial presence in China, while most sanctioned individuals have no business there. Even so, the system is expanding, and authorities have wide discretion in how they apply the available tools. For companies at risk, the landscape remains unpredictable. A spike in geopolitical tensions can trigger any combination of trade restrictions, regulatory probes, or legal designations. Key Issues A fragile truce in the U.S.-China trade war The second U.S.–China trade war, which began escalating on 2 February 2025 as President Donald Trump imposed a ten percent tariff hike on Chinese goods, served as the first major test of China’s expanded economic coercion toolkit. Over the following months, Washington rolled out further measures, including a sweeping “Liberation Day” tariff package. Following several rounds of retaliation from Beijing, U.S. tariffs on Chinese goods had climbed to at least 145 percent.   Unlike during Trump’s first term, China entered this trade war well prepared. It responded not only with its own tariff increases – raising duties on U.S. goods to 125 percent – but also with a wide array of non-tariff measures. These included import suspensions on selected U.S. products such as logs, poultry, soybeans, and Boeing jets, and a reduction in imports of American films. Authorities also issued a travel warning, launched anti-monopoly investigations into Google and DuPont, anti-dumping probes into U.S.-made optical fibers, and placed several U.S. defense firms as well as Illumina and PVH Group on its Unreliable Entity List.   Among the many actions taken, China’s export controls on critical raw materials appears to have made the strongest impression on the Trump administration. These were deployed in two salvos. On 4 February, Beijing announced new licensing requirements for five key minerals: tungsten, tellurium, bismuth, molybdenum, and indium. A second round followed on 14 March, targeting seven rare earth elements. China’s dominance over the global value chain for these inputs – crucial to defense, high-tech, and clean energy – appears to have spooked not only markets but also the White House.   The U.S. and China eventually came to the negotiating table in Geneva in early May. Prior to the talks, President Trump – after markets reacted severely to his global tariffs – had indicated a willingness to lower tariffs on China. When lead negotiators later reached a 90-day truce, many observers interpreted it as Trump’s failure to uphold the tariff pressure he had so aggressively threatened. The US lowered its tariffs from 145 to 30 percent, while China reduced its own from 125 to 10 percent and pledged to withdraw all non-tariff measures imposed since 2 April. By calling Washington’s bluff, China may have come away with a stronger hand in future talks.   The peace, however, remains fragile. Both sides have accused each other of violating the terms of what was in itself a vaguely worded agreement. While tensions have eased for now, the core issues – chief among them the unresolved trade imbalance – remain unresolved. A renewed confrontation could easily erupt if Trump suddenly deemed the deal insufficient. With only five months into his second administration, uncertainty remains high. For many firms that depend on predictability, Beijing is currently seen as easier to read than Washington. A major sticking point in the relationship are China’s stiffening export controls on critical raw materials. These began to bite in response to U.S. technology measures under the Biden administration and escalated sharply during the current trade war. The new framework imposed by Beijing requires export licenses for sensitive items, often involving extensive paperwork for companies. Despite China’s recent pledge to withdraw non-tariff measures, the two sides have disagreed over what that would mean in practice. The U.S. has pushed for a full resumption of trade flows, while China has insisted on retaining the right to impose controls in cases where exports might contribute to military equipment or be deemed dual-use.   China’s new export control system also appears to haven initially been overwhelmed, with thousands of applications flooding the small office responsible for approvals and causing significant delays. It is impossible to say whether these were a mere coincidence or a calculated strategy. Following bilateral talks in London on 9–10 June, however, Beijing reportedly agreed to allow most critical raw materials to flow again to the United States, though it placed a six-month cap on export licenses. Overall, China’s seemingly successful use of these measures against the U.S. may reinforce its confidence in them – potentially emboldening the country to rely on export controls more frequently in future disputes.   For businesses reliant on rare earth supply chains, China’s export control system is more than just a bureaucratic hurdle. Not only will supply disruptions driven by geopolitical tensions likely increase in the future, but the licensing procedures themselves include demands for sensitive commercial data. According to multiple company reports, the Ministry of Commerce requires information about operations, workforce, end-use applications, production information, and even confidential lists of customers. For now, many businesses appear willing to comply to secure access to the critical materials they depend on. However, this poses severe longer-term risks of handing over strategic information to a government which has long faced criticism for weak intellectual property protections. Some experts have noted that these licensing practices could also improve China’s capacity to exercise economic coercion by allowing it to identify and target chokepoints with greater precision. Washington’s trade war, Brussels’ problem Europe finds itself caught in the crossfire of the U.S.-China trade war. As global deliveries of rare earths and magnets became entangled in Chinese licensing procedures, also some European carmakers and medical equipment producers were reportedly forced to halt production. For unsettled officials in Brussels, this has served as a sharp reminder of how Beijing may respond if the EU aligns more closely with Washington on economic security or imposes further restrictions on Chinese firms. In recent weeks, the EU has moved to bar Chinese medical equipment manufacturers from public procurement tenders and also pursues investigations into Chinese electric vehicle subsidies and other trade practices it considers distortive.   China’s rare earths restrictions have already triggered a counterreaction. At the G7 Summit in Canada in mid-June, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen gave a remarkably direct speech, bringing a rare earth magnet with her as a symbol. The magnet had been produced in Estonia by a Canadian firm using Australian raw materials, underscoring the kind of supply chain the EU hopes to build to break China’s near monopoly. In her speech, von der Leyen warned that China was “not only using this quasi-monopoly as a bargaining chip, but weaponizing it” to undermine competitors. She recalled how China had previously flooded the market to wipe out rival firms, calling this a pattern of “dominance, dependency, and blackmail”. At the meeting, the G7 also launched a Critical Minerals Action Plan to diversify production and supply of critical minerals, encouraging investments, and promoting innovation. Still, the world remains a long way from meaningfully reducing its reliance on Chinese rare earths and will have to live with that dependence in the near to mid-term. Dozens of new mines are needed globally to reduce dependency from China. The current average time of 15 years between exploration and the start of commercial mining for raw materials alone shows that Chinese dominance will extend far into the future.   Meanwhile, China continues its outreach to Europe. It appears to have exercised restraint in response to the EU’s own recent economic restrictions, likely hoping that escalating U.S. tariffs on the EU will push Brussels closer to Beijing. In a symbolic gesture, China recently lifted sanctions on several members of the European Parliament. But as economists have pointed out, China cannot replace the role of the U.S. economy for Europe. Furthermore, Europe has its own growing list of grievances with Beijing, independent of Washington’s agenda. These include China’s close alignment with Russia and its support of war efforts against Ukraine, as well as a surge in Chinese exports that many deem as flooding the EU market.   For now, China appears to have used export controls primarily for political reasons – as a successful tool to pressure the U.S. into easing its stance on Beijing. While these measures have not yet been actively directed at the EU, Brussels is wise to prepare for the possibility that China could apply similar tactics against European countries or firms. Having discovered a new and effective form of economic leverage, Beijing may not hesitate to deploy it for commercial advantage as well.   In a long history of unequal market conditions, these tools are a new chapter in the massive promotion of Chinese industrial champions against European competitors. The EU, which over the past years has assembled its own toolbox of trade defense instruments, will likely soon be tested – not only symbolically, meaning whether Brussels dares deploy its sharper instruments, but also substantially, i.e. whether the latter actually work against China’s tools.

Ischinger: Rezepte für Verhandlungen mit Russland Im MRD Aktuell  Podcast skizziert Botschafter a.D. Prof. Dr. h.c. Wolfgang Ischinger, ehemaliger Vorsitzender der Münchner Sicherheitskonferenz sowie Ehrenvorsitzender des Aufsichtsrats der Agora Strategy Group AG, mögliche Wege für zukünftige Friedensgespräche im Ukraine-Krieg. Botschafter Ischinger betont, dass erste Fortschritte über kleine, konkrete Schritte wie Gefangenenaustausche erzielt werden können. Entscheidend sei, zunächst auf direkte Gespräche zwischen Putin und Selenskyj zu verzichten und stattdessen Unterhändler einzusetzen. Auch eine internationale Kontaktgruppe – ähnlich wie in Bosnien in den 1990ern – könnte neue Impulse bringen. Ein Waffenstillstand müsse zudem vertraglich abgesichert und international kontrolliert werden, um künftige Eskalationen zu verhindern. Für Botschafter Ischinger ist klar: Verhandlungen mit Russland brauchen pragmatische Formate, Realismus und internationale Rückendeckung. Hier geht es zum vollständigen Podcast: https://www.mdr.de/nachrichten/podcast/ukrainekrieg/audio-russland-verhandlungen-frieden-waffenruhe-100.html

Tech-Wettrüsten zwischen China und USA Download des Reports: Zusammenfassung Der Systemwettbewerb zwischen den USA und China bestimmt die aktuelle geopolitische Dynamik, gerade auch in der Hochtechnologie. Dominanz z.B. bei Künstlicher Intelligenz (KI), Quantencomputing und in der Halbleiterproduktion ist zu einem entscheidenden Machtfaktor geworden, der traditionelle Formen internationaler Einflussnahme ergänzt und zum Teil ersetzt. Der weltweite KI-Markt wird bis 2030 voraussichtlich auf rund 1.800 Mrd. USD anwachsen, während der für Halbleiter etwa 1.400 Mrd. USD erreichen könnte. Für Quantencomputing wird ein Volumen von über 60 Mrd. USD prognostiziert. Die beiden Supermächte verfolgen dabei grundlegend verschiedene Innovationsmodelle: Die USA setzen auf privatwirtschaftliche Dynamik und Deregulierung, während China staatlich gelenkte Innovation mit intensivem Marktdruck  kombiniert. Die systemische Konkurrenz um die Kontrolle von Zukunftstechnologien führt zu einer Fragmentierung der globalen Tech-Ökosysteme  und wachsender Komplexität für international agierende Unternehmen. Sie müssen nicht nur unterschiedliche technische Standards umsetzen und mit gegensätzlichen Regulierungsphilosophien umgehen, sondern auch im Wettbewerb um die besten Tech-Talente  erfolgreich sein. Europa versucht, sich mit einer Kombination aus wissenschaftlicher Exzellenz und wertebasierter Regulierung als  dritter Pol  zu positionieren. So bietet das 2024 verabschiedete weltweit erste KI-Gesetz (AI Act) Chancen für differenzierte Wettbewerbsvorteile, birgt aber auch Innovationsrisiken. Bemerkenswerte Entwicklungen wie der chinesische KI-Durchbruch  mit DeepSeek zeigen, dass sich die etablierten finanzintensiven Spielregeln für die KI-Entwicklung ändern – eine Chance für agile europäische Akteure , die ihre industriellen Stärken mit digitaler Innovation verbinden. Europäische Unternehmen  stehen vor der Herausforderung, ihren eigenen Weg in diesem komplexen Umfeld zu finden. Mit den richtigen Strategien – fokussierte Spezialisierung, technologische Autonomie in Schlüsselbereichen, wertebasierte Innovation und aktives Talentmanagement – können sie nicht nur bestehen, sondern gestärkt aus diesem Wettbewerb hervorgehen  – vorausgesetzt es gibt Finanzierung dafür. Handlungsempfehlungen für Unternehmen finden Sie im Report (Download siehe oben)

Agora Strategy Executive Briefing on Elections in South Korea Executive Summary South Korea’s new president Lee Jae-myung’s foreign policy direction will champion a pragmatism that could see him rebalancing previously value-driven relations with China, Russia, North Korea and Japan. While reaffirming the centrality of Korea’s alliance with the U.S. and closeness to Europe, Lee has also signaled a softer tone on China and Russia, putting the country at odds with its Western partners. Continued US pressure related to export controls and economic security will limit his room for maneuver in engaging China, but on Russia, Lee would likely follow a Trump lead in lifting of sanctions, potentially jeopardizing Seoul’s relationship with European partners. This expected recalibration and Lee’s promises for strategic investments open opportunities for European firms in many important sectors, including green tech, defense, and digital cooperation. Implications for International Business New openings in defense, digital, and green tech : Lee has reaffirmed Europe as a strategic partner and announced investments plans for key sectors, including AI, semiconductors, and batteries. Firms aligned with Korean priorities may benefit from expanded R&D partnerships. Watch Korea's Russia stance carefully : If Lee moves to reengage Moscow in lockstep with U.S. President Trump, EU-based firms may face reputational or compliance risks due to diverging sanctions environments, in addition to potential loss of competitiveness compared to Korean firms. State of Play Some calm after the storm Lee Jae-myung’s resounding election win on 3 June ends six months of political chaos in South Korea, following former President Yoon Suk-yeol’s impeachment after the imposition of martial law in late 2024. With a strong legislative majority, Lee enters office from a position of strength, bringing back a degree of stability to South Korea’s fractured domestic politics. His immediate focus will lie on negotiating a tariff deal with the U.S. He has previously condemned the tariffs as unjustified and signaled a tougher negotiation stance than the previous caretaker government, potentially in cooperation with partners like the EU or Japan.   South Korea and the EU have a solid relationship and have significantly deepened their strategic partnership. In March, they concluded a landmark Digital Trade Agreement, enhancing cooperation in areas such as digital signatures, data protection, and e-commerce, thereby facilitating smoother digital trade between the two economies. Additionally, their collaboration in security and defence has intensified, with both parties engaging in joint efforts to address hybrid threats, cyber-security, and the resilience of critical infrastructure, reflecting their shared commitment to global stability.   Lee has recently moderated his previously firebrand criticism of Japan and now supports continued trilateral cooperation with Washington and Tokyo, as both South Korea and Japan are security alliance partners of the United States. Still, historical disputes stemming from World War II and before remain a flashpoint and could derail the relationship with Tokyo, especially in the realm of security cooperation. Lee will also adopt a more conciliatory tone with Beijing on the surface—although he faces limits due to continued U.S. pressure on economic security and export controls. Key Issues A noticeable, yet limited geopolitical realignment The incoming Lee administration will maintain the U.S. alliance as the foundation of its security policy, especially considering North Korea’s advancing missile and nuclear capabilities. However, while Lee has acknowledged he wants to continue trilateral cooperation with the U.S. and Japan, he is unlikely to support deepening it further into a formal bloc, especially in defense, which he sees as risking overextension and possibly provoking tighter coordination between North Korea, China, and Russia. He will be more skeptical about joint drills and defense integration. This will slow progress on defense interoperability and supply chain integration, as Lee shifts focus toward economic, cultural, and social cooperation with Japan.     President Lee will reorient foreign policy toward Korea’s immediate neighborhood, de-emphasizing South Korea’s security links to Europe or the Taiwan Strait, prioritizing economic ties instead. On North Korea, he will maintain deterrence while attempting to re-open dialogue and humanitarian cooperation, coordinated with America to avoid marginalization in any talks with Kim Jong-Un. Should President Trump re-engage with Moscow, Lee will likely follow, eyeing economic opportunities for Korean firms and Russian leverage in talks with the North. This would lead to friction with Europeans and could complicate sanctions compliance for European firms doing business in South Korea.   China remains South Korea’s biggest trading partner, with 19.5 per cent of total exports going to the country in 2024, a drop from 26 per cent in 2020. Lee has vowed to boost economic engagement with Beijing. But this may prove difficult, as U.S. pressure on export controls and tech alignment intensifies. While Seoul’s tone toward Beijing will soften, quiet de-risking and market diversification will continue. At the same time, Lee will seek closer coordination with partners—including the EU, Japan, ASEAN, and APEC—to hedge against a renewed wave of U.S. trade volatility. Businesses should prepare for a more autonomous South Korea: flexible, hedging its bets, and focused on securing regional influence on its own terms. An economic agenda providing opportunities for European businesses Lee’s economic platform rests on strong public investment—especially in high-tech and green industries—and recalibrated trade diversification. U.S. tariff threats remain a central concern and represent the most crucial stumbling block for Seoul’s relations with the US. Sectoral tariffs on steel, aluminum, and automobiles have already dented Korean exports in May to both the US and China, while exports to the EU have increased. Trump’s threats to increase some tariffs to 50% adds further pressure. Lee condemned these measures and signaled his intention to coordinate more closely with similarly affected partners—especially the EU and Japan—to develop joint responses or push for reform. For European firms, such alignment could lead to better outcomes.   Korean firms are increasingly setting their sights on the European market. Investments for example in the battery and electric vehicles (EV) sector could increase, helping European companies to de-risk their supply chains from Chinese inputs in these sectors. A notable example is the seven-year agreement between Samsung SDI and Hyundai Motor, under which Samsung will supply prismatic batteries for Hyundai's European EVs from 2026 to 2032. These batteries featuring high nickel NCA cathodes and silicon-based anodes will be manufactured at Samsung SDI's Hungary plant, enhancing Europe's EV supply chain resilience.   Defense is another promising area. Lee upholds South Korea’s longstanding bipartisan commitment to treating the defense sector as an engine of industrial growth. His administration is expected to boost funding for military R&D, strengthen public-private coordination, and expand international partnerships. With Korean defense exports rising and European rearmament underway, there is clear potential for joint production, co-development, and technology transfer in both directions.   Lee’s green energy ambitions—particularly in offshore wind—create another opportunity for European businesses. Recent auctions for up to 8 GW of offshore wind capacity, including major projects by Copenhagen Offshore Partners and Equinor, offer European firms new avenues for investment and collaboration. Thos are already active in Korea’s wind sector and stand to benefit from increased public offerings.

In dem Agora Strategy Group Geopolitik-Podcast „The Future of Power“, lädt Dr. Timo Blenk (CEO) monatlich Entscheidungsträger aus Diplomatie, Wirtschaft, Politik und Militär ein, um aktuelle geopolitische Entwicklungen zu diskutieren. Über die Einflüsse dieser zu informieren und fundierte Entscheidungsgrundlagen zu schaffen, ist der Kern dieses Projekts.   Diesen Monat zu Gast ist Dr. Jürgen Michels, Chefvolkswirt und Leiter der BayernLB und Leiter der Abteilung "Research und Volkswirtschaft"! In der 30ten Folge unseres Podcasts sprechen Dr. Blenk und Dr. Michels über die Zukunft der Finanzmärkte und werfen einen geoökonomischen Blick auf die Welt!   Sie finden unseren Podcast mit Untertiteln auch auf Youtube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zxpx3BieBgk Die wichtigsten Themen des Monats Sorgenkind USA: Zinslast, Zölle und Druck auf die FED Europa: zwischen Kapitalmarktunion, Investitionsspritzen und Verteidigungsausgaben Geoökonomie Big Picture: die EU im Sandwich, Digitalsteuer & Ölhandel     Hausmitteilungen   Alle weiteren Folgen des Podcasts Agora Strategy Webauftritt Agora Strategy bei LinkedIn Aktuelle Projekte & Veranstaltungen des Agora-Strategy-Teams Agora Strategy Institute Executive Mitgliedschaft Agora Strategy Executive Briefing: Thailand: Internal Instability and Regional Volatility Agora Strategy Executive Briefing: From Values to Interests: South Korea Recalibrates its Approach    Dean's Comment: Merz Meets Trump: The Art of Expectation Management

Europa muss wieder verteidigungsfähig werden Im Interview mit Finanz und Wirtschaft  fordert Botschafter a.D. Prof. Dr. h.c. Wolfgang Ischinger, ehemaliger Vorsitzender der Münchner Sicherheitskonferenz sowie Ehrenvorsitzender des Aufsichtsrats der Agora Strategy Group AG, eine umfassende Reform der europäischen Verteidigungspolitik. Botschafter Ischinger betont: Europa könne sich nicht mehr auf die USA als Schutzmacht verlassen und müsse selbst handlungsfähig werden. Dazu gehöre eine deutliche Steigerung der Verteidigungsausgaben, eine Konsolidierung der Rüstungssysteme sowie ein politischer Wille zur sicherheitspolitischen Eigenverantwortung. Deutschland und Frankreich könnten dabei eine Pionierrolle übernehmen. Denn für Botschafter Ischinger ist klar: Nur ein eigenständiges, entschlossenes und verteidigungsfähiges Europa kann künftige Bedrohungen glaubwürdig abschrecken. Hier geht es zum vollständigen Interview: https://www.fuw.ch/wolfgang-ischinger-europa-muss-wieder-verteidigungsfaehig-werden-328935957590

General a.D. Domröse: „Die NATO steht vor einer Mammutaufgabe“ In einem aktuellen Interview mit rbb24 Inforadio  kommentiert General a. D. Hans-Lothar Domröse, ehemaliger NATO-Kommandeur, Viersternegeneral der Bundeswehr und Senior Advisor der Agora Strategy Group AG, die geplanten Beschlüsse des NATO-Gipfels in Den Haag. Aus seiner Sicht stellt die massive Aufrüstung kein Symbol militärischer Aggression dar, sondern eine notwendige Investition in die europäische Sicherheit und Handlungsfähigkeit. Domröse betont, dass die NATO vor einer historischen Herausforderung steht: Bestehende Fähigkeitslücken müssen geschlossen, moderne Technologien wie Drohnensysteme integriert und die militärische Infrastruktur gestärkt werden. Zugleich sei es an der Zeit, die Abhängigkeit von den USA zu verringern und europäische Verteidigungsfähigkeit eigenständig abzusichern. Was auf den ersten Blick nach hohen Kosten klingt, ist laut Domröse ein „Investitionsprogramm in die Sicherheit“. Nur wer heute entschlossen handelt, kann auch in Zukunft souverän leben – und Europas strategische Autonomie nachhaltig stärken. Hier geht es zum vollständigen Interview: https://www.inforadio.de/rubriken/interviews/2025/06/25/nato-gipfel-den-haag-interview-mit-hans-lothar-domroese.html

Agora Strategy Executive Briefing on Thailand Executive Summary Thailand – despite being a U.S. ally – de facto practices “bamboo diplomacy” by pursuing flexible and pragmatic bilateral relations with America, China and other powers, swaying in multiple directions over time in line with its national interests. Tensions between the Thailand’s old political establishment and pro-reform groups will likely negatively affect political stability for the foreseeable future. Rising global protectionism and concerns over political instability are set to limit GDP growth to around 2.5%, considerably lower than that of its neighbours. Implications for International Business To mitigate pressure from the U.S. and China, Thailand is actively seeking to expand its business relationships with Europe which opens opportunities for European businesses, specifically in green mobility, green tech and renewable energy, infrastructure and transport, digital industries, biotechnology as well as the healthcare industry. The risk of further political instability in Thailand, including the risk of a coup d’etat, remains heightened; international businesses are well advised to practice continuous risk monitoring and associated scenario building, engage in corporate diplomacy, form strong partnerships with local firms, and, if possible, diversify across multiple Southeast Asian countries. While international businesses (including from China) have flocked to Thailand in the context of “China+1” in recent years, there is now a need to hedge against potential disruptions under Trump 2.0 by expanding geographic and operational flexibility across the region to avoid lock-ins. State of Play Generally, Thailand continues to grapple with political instability, restrictions on freedom of expression, and the influence of conservative elites over democratic processes. The country’s Prime minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra, in office since 2024, currently faces two major hurdles in domestic politics: First, she needs to manage the fractious internal politics of an often disparate 12-party coalition. Second, she needs to bridge the general political divide between the old establishment of royalty, bureaucracy and military, and the Pheu Thai Party (PTP) she has been leading since October 2023 and other reformist forces. If she fails either task, wider political instability, and with it the risk of a coup d’etat, will likely increase. Political instability notwithstanding, the current government has put a strong focus on sustaining economic growth as well as bringing about a more equitable income distribution to increase domestic consumption (Thailand has Asia’s highest rates of income inequality). Policies to reduce it include prolonging a debt moratorium for small scale farmers and doubling the minimum wage. Furthermore, the government tries to reduce over-dependence on the tourism sector by investing more in green and high-tech sectors and related infrastructure. However, high U.S. tariffs are likely to force the government to reallocate some public spending to counter their impact. Internationally, Bangkok currently seeks to diversify its economic dependence on the US and China by advancing trade and investment negotiations with other international partners. Thailand recently became a BRICS partner country and began accession talks for OECD membership in 2024, the second Southeast Asian country after Indonesia. Following a period of strained relations after Thailand's 2014 military coup, the EU and Thailand have revitalized their relations, most notably by reviving negotiations for an EU-Thailand Free Trade Agreement. The EU is Thailand's fourth-largest trading partner, and some analysts have suggested that the agreement could potentially double Thailand's trade with the EU. Moreover, Thailand is an important regional hub. It is particularly competitive in manufacturing due to its strong automotive, electronics, and agribusiness sectors as well as associated suppliers and supply chains. To be sure, in logistics, Singapore –also the region’s undisputed financial centre – and increasingly Malaysia, outperform Thailand. However, Thailand has become an attractive destination for international firms’ "China+1" strategy, by which they couple investments in China with a second facility in another Asian economy. The country offers a strong manufacturing base, membership in multiple free trade agreements (including with Japan, Australia, and China), and access to other markets in Asia and beyond Asia. Key Issues Geopolitics Thailand is a major non-NATO ally of the U.S., which suggests close strategic alignment with Washington. However, in reality, Thailand’s strategic posture is best described as hedging or “bamboo diplomacy”. Bangkok has maintained close relationships with the U.S. and China whilst avoiding over-reliance on either. This has allowed Thailand to simultaneously maintain close security and economic ties with the U.S. and deepen its economic relationship with China. Throughout the last decade, however, Bangkok’s relations with Beijing have expanded from mainly economic, including in the field of security and defence with arms purchases and joint naval exercises: From 2019 to 2023, China accounted for 44% of Thailand's major weapon imports, more than doubling its share compared to the previous five-year period. Relations with the U.S., in turn, have cooled because of a freeze of U.S. aid in response to the 2014 coup d’etat and U.S. criticism of Thailand’s democratic backsliding. While U.S. policymakers understand that Thailand is not “choosing China”, but rather trying to hedge, they view Thailand’s ties with China with concern. Therefore, Washington’s strategic focus has been on other allies, notably the Philippines, Australia and Japan. The EU and Thailand have decided to resuscitate negotiations for an EU-Thailand Free Trade Agreement to be completed by the end of 2025. In its immediate neighborhood, Thailand enjoys generally cooperative relations with Laos, for which it serves as a major investor in hydropower projects and other infrastructure. Ties to Cambodia have been marked by territorial disputes in the past but have recently improved as the result of an agreed freezing of the disputes and growing economic interdependence. Bilateral cooperation has since intensified in the fields of trade, investment, energy and border management. Relations with Myanmar, in contrast, have significantly deteriorated since the coup there in 2021 and the ensuing civil war. Thailand has faced a huge influx of refugees and fighting has occasionally spilled onto Thai territory. To maintain regional autonomy amid great power rivalry, Thailand has in the past a policy of putting the ASEAN group of Southeast Asian countries at the centre. It has tried to leverage platforms like the ASEAN Regional Forum and the East Asia Summit to shape regional agendas on trade, development, and connectivity. This “ASEAN centrality” fits nicely with Bangkok’s hedging strategy between the U.S. and China. However, ASEAN norms of non-interference and consensus decision-making have limited Thailand’s ability to move forward on regional issues it deems important, especially on Myanmar. In practice, therefore, Thailand increasingly choses coalitions of the willing over ASEAN to influence regional issues. Thailand is not party to the conflicts in the South China Sea or the Taiwan Strait. Any military involvement is therefore unlikely. However, an escalation in the South China Sea or the Taiwan Strait would almost certainly disrupt maritime trade routes through which a significant portion of Thailand’s trade flows. Diplomatically, its hedging strategy would almost certainly come under immense pressure. It is likely that Washington would pressure Bangkok to fulfil its alliance obligations, including the use of Thai military installations such as U-Tapao. So far, Thailand has tried to avoid becoming a pawn in a great power conflict. Geoeconomics Thailand is Southeast Asia’s second largest economy and is considered a major regional trade and manufacturing hub. The country offers a range of incentives to attract foreign direct investment (FDI), especially in strategic sectors like advanced manufacturing, digital industries, biotechnology, and green energy. These include tax-related incentives such as exemptions or reductions on corporate income tax or import duties. They also include non-tax incentives such as liberalizing foreign ownership, eased visa and work permit processes, access to infrastructure, logistics, and data access support, and faster customs clearance and project approvals. Thailand has also taken some steps to align with international environmental, social, and governance (ESG) as well as due diligence standards, particularly as demands by global investors and trading partners increase. Its approach combines regulatory reforms, voluntary frameworks, and market-driven adaptations. Also, Bangkok is preparing to align with standards such as the EU Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive or the German Supply Chain Act. However, the country’s response is uneven across sectors and enforcement of compliance remains inconsistent. Thailand also is one of the largest indirect beneficiaries of U.S. tariffs against Chinese companies, as many of the latter sought alternative manufacturing bases in non-tariffed countries. As a result, exports from Thailand to the U.S. strongly increased since 2017. This has earned it the ire of the second Trump administration: The 36% tariff the country now faces is among the highest among Southeast Asian nations. Additionally, Thailand’s role in manufacturing exposes it to significant knock-on effects from global trade disruptions—even if it is not the primary target. Furthermore, Thailand would also be affected by a further decrease in economic growth in China due to a further reduction in Chinese demand for Thai components (e.g., plastics, chemicals, agri-commodities) as China is Thailand’s largest export market. Relocation or diversification to Thailand in the context of the China+1 strategy to mitigate exposure to the Sino-US trade war can be beneficial for European companies. Thailand’s government offers considerable support to investors, especially in key economic sectors. The conclusion of a free trade agreement with the EU would furthermore reduce tariffs, improve protection of intellectual property, and enhance regulatory cooperation. However, European companies must also consider Thailand’s fragile domestic politics, its structural predicaments (i.e. lack of skilled labour or compliance risks due to lax enforcement), as well as the negative impact on Thailand of the Chinese Market. Lastly, a further reconfiguration of global supply chains and trade policies under Trump 2.0. looms large on the horizon.

Dean’s Comment on the meeting between President Trump and Federal Chancellor Merz by Ambassador (ret.) Dr. Peter Ammon From the outset of his chancellorship, Friedrich Merz made it clear that he intended to take control of German foreign policy himself, guiding the country through geopolitical uncertainty with a steady hand. His face-to-face meeting with President Trump in the Oval Office, under the scrutiny of a partly hostile press corps and ideological hardliners such as Vice President Vance, was widely regarded as the first significant trial of his leadership on the global stage.   Germany is the main driver of the EU’s substantial trade surplus with the United States. A wide array of other contentious issues loomed over the meeting: Germany’s perceived free-riding on defence in the past; diverging positions on Russia and Ukraine; and clashing interpretations of democracy and free speech. Observers feared a political ambush reminiscent of those faced by Presidents Zelensky and Ramaphosa.   Merz wisely focused on managing expectations beforehand. Nobody anticipated that he could resolve Trump’s ongoing trade war with the EU during the meeting — an issue that was largely outside his direct control. For the German side, avoiding open confrontation while maintaining essential transatlantic ties — without appearing obsequious — would already be considered a major success.   Meanwhile, Trump is navigating a precarious phase of his presidency. His promise to end the Russia–Ukraine war in 24 hours remains unfulfilled. His global trade wars have stalled. Once-powerful alliances with tech giants such as Elon Musk and Tim Cook of Apple are showing signs of strain. To make matters worse, the bond market is issuing early warnings of an impending recession coupled with inflation.   Against this backdrop of fragility, Trump presented a conciliatory stance towards the Chancellor. He may have had little appetite for escalating tensions with the German chancellor, especially since Germany overtook Japan at the end of last year to become the world’s largest creditor nation. Trump even called Merz a friend and expressed his appreciation of US–German relations. What more could Merkel and Germany have asked for?

Agora Strategy Executive Briefing on Geopolitics of AI Executive Summary The United States under Trump has made AI dominance a top priority, repealing AI safety rules and adding 70 Chinese entities on an export blacklist for AI chips. The EU has eventually started to shift away from its overt focus on AI regulation towards a competitiveness agenda to spur innovation within the Single Market. China experiences an AI boom after DeepSeek’s moment with the Hang Seng benchmark index for tech stocks surging by more than 40% since mid-January. Implications for International Business The race to lead in AI provides opportunities, such as industries reaping productivity gains from the adoption of AI systems in their operations and benefiting from public investments that seek to drive innovation at home. At the same time, complex and fragmented national AI regulations can lead to legal risks while export controls on advanced AI chips are likely to restrict the flow of technological goods. State of Play AI as a determinant of national power Recent developments have demonstrated the fundamental shift that AI is causing on the global security and economic landscape, from AI-enabled drones in Ukraine to AI innovations awarded two Nobel Prizes in 2024. As a result, some governments aim to achieve supremacy over AI development. The United States has outpaced other countries, currently developing 70 percent of the world’s notable AI models. China is catching up, as indicated by the release of DeepSeek’s R1 model. In addition, the EU aims to become an AI continent by simplifying its tech rulebook and setting up AI factories that provide computing resources to European innovators. The EU’s push for AI innovation has been partly prompted by technological breakthroughs in the United States and China, as well as by the lack of European alternatives. The UAE and Saudi Arabia have also identified AI as a key driver of their economic diversification from hydrocarbons, with Abu Dhabi having launched an investment firm with a target size of $100 billion to push for AI dominance.   Moreover, these developments have provided a geopolitical role for major corporations. Google has lifted its ban on using AI for developing weapons, while Meta has announced $65 billion investments on AI this year, with the aim to build the world’s largest AI data center. With these decisions, firms aim to become strategic actors themselves in the AI race. This tech-driven world could provide significant benefits to other international businesses too. Across the banking industry, the technology could deliver up to $340 billion annually, while in retail the impact could reach up to $660 billion. However, companies will need to navigate through the geoeconomic risks of the AI race, such as export controls and complex regulations. State of Play The geopolitical implications of AI and technology The military use of AI-enabled weapons is growing. Ukraine’s military has deployed AI-equipped drones to strike Russian critical infrastructure. American AI systems have been used to identify airstrike targets in Syria and Yemen. Such rapid AI advancements could lead to further breakthroughs and create geopolitical tensions. For one, AI lowers the barrier for malign actors, including terrorist groups, to develop and produce chemical or biological threats by providing detailed instructions for assembling viruses. For another, AI applications pose severe risks for governments as they can tip the military balance in favor of adversaries. To mitigate this scenario, governments aim to spur innovation and maintain their position in the cutting-edge of technological development. The US Stargate project aims to achieve that by investing $500 billion over the next four years towards building new AI data centers for OpenAI. In the EU, President von der Leyen announced €200 billion of public and private investments to boost the continent’s AI competitiveness. While it is uncertain if these investments will yield concrete results, governments clearly aim to develop and secure sovereign AI capabilities that will provide security and economic benefits.   In addition to AI development efforts, governments often aim to impede the progress of their adversaries. Washington has imposed a series of economic restrictions on China, such as blocking Chinese providers from direct access to the advanced semiconductors required for frontier AI development. The Netherlands and Japan, who hold a strategic position in the global semiconductors value chain, have aligned with these restrictions, directly affecting firms such as ASML, which sourced 26 percent of its sales from China in 2023. In January 2025, the United States not only expanded export controls to more countries but also introduced further restrictions on AI model weights – the parameters containing a model’s capabilities. This is likely to impact US providers like Nvidia and AMD which are faced with significant revenue threats. Besides absolute restrictions, a series of countries face limits on the number of AI chips that can be deployed within their jurisdictions. For example, countries like the UAE, India and Mexico cannot import more than 7 percent of Nvidia’s or AMD’s AI chips. These policies have amounted to a new form of technological protectionism, in which America makes use of economic statecraft and its diplomatic relationships to preserve its advantage. DeepSeek’s CEO himself has described these restrictions as the most significant challenge that his company faces. Geoeconomic risks and opportunities in the AI race The integration of AI into the geopolitical calculus of nation states generates both political and financial risks. Jurisdictions have adopted regulatory frameworks to implement guardrails and ensure the safe deployment of AI systems, such as the EU’s AI Act, which addresses AI systems with a potentially adverse impact on people’s safety or fundamental rights. For example, it bans systems that exploit vulnerabilities of individuals or use manipulation, while strictly regulating systems deployed in sensitive areas such as education, law enforcement and critical infrastructure. Failure to comply can lead to fines of up to 7 percent of a company’s global annual turnover or €35 million, whichever is higher. This has prompted companies such as Meta, OpenAI and Apple to delay the launch of some AI products in the EU market. At the same time, other jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom and the United States have opted for differentiated regulatory frameworks. In the latter alone, the number of pending AI-related bills at both the federal and state level has risen to 781 in 2025. Such regulatory divergences can increase the cost of compliance and impose legal uncertainty on international businesses. In Colorado for example, developers need to conduct AI Impact Assessments which can differ significantly in the types of AI systems that are covered and the required obligations in comparison to the EU’s conformity assessment. Finally, countries and regions with a low level of AI preparedness, including limited connectivity infrastructure and AI talent, will not be able to reap the military and economic benefits of AI and risk falling behind.   There are also significant opportunities that the AI race presents for companies. Firstly, the mobilization of public investments creates financial opportunities for experimentation and the adoption of AI within traditional industries. The EU plans to dedicate €20 billion of its AI investment portfolio to a European AI Fund which will direct resources for AI research, innovation and diffusion. Secondly, governments are ushering a simplification agenda to be able to compete with their rivals. London aims to establish ‘AI Growth Zones’ to streamline the planning approval process for AI data centers and facilitate the provision of clean energy sources. Currently, businesses in the EU must navigate a complex patchwork of 27 distinct corporate regimes. In 2026, the EU plans to introduce a ‘28th regime’ to offer an alternative harmonized legal system that firms can opt into and benefit from harmonized corporate requirements. Thirdly, businesses stand to benefit from the competition between AI providers. McKinsey reports that 42 percent of organizations see cost reduction from AI implementation and 59 percent experience revenue increases. Therefore, the race between AI providers to develop better and cheaper products can have direct positive impacts for both large corporations and small businesses.

In dem Agora Strategy Group Geopolitik-Podcast „The Future of Power“, lädt Dr. Timo Blenk (CEO) monatlich Entscheidungsträger aus Diplomatie, Wirtschaft, Politik und Militär ein, um aktuelle geopolitische Entwicklungen zu diskutieren. Über die Einflüsse dieser zu informieren und fundierte Entscheidungsgrundlagen zu schaffen, ist der Kern dieses Projekts.   Diesen Monat zu Gast ist Admiral a.D. Joachim Rühle, Vier-Sterne Offizier der Bundeswehr und ausgewiesener Militärexperte! In der 29ten Folge unseres Podcasts sprechen Dr. Blenk und Admiral a.D. Rühle über die Zukunft der Bundeswehr und werfen einen militärischen Blick auf die Welt!   Die wichtigsten Themen des Monats Maritime Handelsrouten: Chokepoints, militärischer Schutz & wirtschaftliche Bedeutung Bundeswehr 2.0: zwischen Modernisierung, Personalproblemen und Chancen Blick auf die Welt: chinesische Kapazitäten, Zukunft der Ukraine & der NATO-Elefant     Hausmitteilungen   Alle weiteren Folgen des Podcasts Agora Strategy Webauftritt Agora Strategy bei LinkedIn Aktuelle Projekte & Veranstaltungen des Agora-Strategy-Teams Agora Strategy Institute Executive Mitgliedschaft Agora Strategy Executive Briefing: US policy reversal Agora Strategy Executive Briefing: The Geopolitics of AI   Unser COO, Fabian Vetter im brandeins Magazin Sie finden unseren Podcast mit Untertiteln auch auf Youtube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DXNkhSRVgE0